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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
DEFINING ĪŚVARA: A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF
CLASSICAL YOGA
by
Daniella Vaclavik
Florida International University, 2013
Miami, Florida
Professor Nathan Katz, Major Professor
The mere presence of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra has come to affect the
meaning of both the path and the goal of Classical Yoga as well as the meaning of the
term Yoga itself. The frequent translation of the term īśvara as God leads to the system of
Classical Yoga to be labeled as theistic, particularly obscuring the interpretation of
īśvarapraṇidhāna, a functional component of the system, as well as perpetuating a
syncretic trend that has led to the popular understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the
divine’. From identifying problematic hermeneutical trends and their underlying causes,
as well as understanding the term within the constraints of the original text in its original
Sanskrit, the term īśvara emerges as the archetype of an ultimate reality functioning as a
practical and experiential tool providing the yogi with a direct glimpse of its true nature.
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PREFACE
Since I began my journey into Yoga I have been extremely lucky to have been
exposed to highly qualified and exemplary teachers, yet I noticed many of my teachers
would use conflicting ideologies as support arguments for their positions, thus attempting
to reconcile Classical Yoga with several other ideologies. The most intriguing statement
came from my Yoga Guru, Śrī K. Pattabhi Jois,1 or ‘Guruji’, as students affectionately
address him. When describing his lineage of Aṣṭaṅga Yoga he would say: “Aṣṭaṅga
Yoga is Patañjali Yoga”. Since I had been studying the text for some time, I had a
particular understanding of what that entailed. To me, it meant he adhered to the
philosophy Patañjali followed, mainly, a dualistic model, quite contrary from that of
Advaita Vedanta or Bhakti Yoga. Furthermore, when asked by one of his students to
define Yoga, Guruji responded: “Yoga is when you see God everywhere”. His definition
of Yoga, to me, seemed like a complete contradiction of Patañjali’s ontology. I was even
more intrigued, when I noticed his reconciliation between caste, religion, and practice, for
this meant he had different allegiances and ideologies as a Brahmin (priestly caste), a
Śaivaite (follower of Śiva), and a Patañjala Yoga guru. For him, it seemed, the
contradiction of these three paths was not the least problematic, which seems to be a very
common attitude among many practitioners. However, I believe the problem arises when
this attitude is translated from personal practice to scholarship, as it may feed the

1

Śrī K. Pattabhi Jois (1915-2009) was an Indian guru from Mysore, India, and the founder of the Kṛṣṇa
Pattabhi Jois Aṣṭaṅga Yoga Institute (previously the Aṣṭaṅga Yoga Research Institute).
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reductionism of unique and complex systems of thought during the process of
reconciliation.
I began graduate school knowing I wanted to further explore the Yogasūtra of
Patañjali, yet I was unsure what I wanted to focus on. While studying the text I came
across a subject I had purposely ignored since I first became interested in Yoga
philosophy: īśvara. All of the teachers I had come across in the past would be reluctant to
fully define the nature of īśvara as well as its purpose and functionality within the
tradition in a way that satisfied my inquiry. Some simply translated it as God, and
additionally, others dismissed it completely as an optional path because of the
presentation of īśvarapraṇidhāna2 in the first chapter of the Yogasūtra and completely
ignored its involvement in the second chapter. The more objective scholars are on the
topic, the more reluctant they seem to make a definite conclusion. Even though some
scholars attempt to stay true to the ontology Patañjali’s Yogasūtra follow, nevertheless
they contribute to the obscurity of the identity and nature of the term īśvara by continuing
to use the terms ‘God’ or ‘Lord’ as a suitable translation. Thus, my motivation for the
present study arises from my frustration in attempting to find an answer to the following
questions: Who is īśvara? What is Yoga? And how does the definition of these two relate
to each other? It is my sincere hope to be able to shed some light on this topic through a
new perspective in the hermeneutics of Classical Yoga.
2

While these terms and concepts will be explored further throughout this study, particularly in Chapter 5,
īśvarapraṇidhāna is presented in the first chapter of the Yogasūtra in sūtra I.23 as īśvarapraṇidhānadvā
(īśvara + praṇidhāna + vā). The word vā is translated to ‘or’, which is a possible reason why it is
sometimes interpreted as an alternative to other methods. However, this is only valid if the first chapter is
isolated from the rest of the text, since īśvarapraṇidhāna is foundational to kriyāyoga and Aṣṭaṅga Yoga,
presented in the second chapter, therefore, it should not be completely dismissed as an optional path. As
this analysis will demonstrate, it is rather a functional method within the system of Patañjali Yoga.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Classical Yoga: The Yogasūtra of Patañjali
In many cases, and certainly most popularly, the term Yoga, deriving from the
Sanskrit verb root ‘yuj’, meaning to yoke, has been translated as union. This translation
prompts the need to define what is being joined, and hence how that definition of Yoga
relates to the Yogasūtra of Patañjali and the path it propounds. Therefore, the primary
motivation for the present study arises from the deceptively simple question: ‘what is
Yoga’? And how and to what extent the understanding of the term īśvara in the
Yogasūtra is a determinant of such definition. In an attempt to define Yoga, 3 it considers
two opposing definitions: Yoga as ‘union’ and Yoga as ‘harnessing’, since the definition
of the term would be directly related to the goal the system it comes to represent. Given
the ambiguity of the term īśvara, its interpretation and translation would come to directly
affect both the path and the ontology of Classical Yoga, as well as the interpretation and
thus the understanding of the term Yoga itself.
The Yogasūtra is a work attributed to the Sage Patañjali, who, while his identity is
not entirely clear, is understood to not have been the creator of the system of Yoga, but
rather a compiler of an older system, or possibly a collection of different Yoga
techniques. The identity of Patañjali as well as the date of the text are both uncertain.

3

Yoga. m. √yuj - “the act of yoking, joining, attaching, harnessing, putting to (of horses)... selfconcentration, abstract meditation, and mental abstraction practiced as a system (as taught by Patañjali and
called the Yoga philosophy)” (Monier William 856).
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While some attach him to mythological characters considering him to be the “incarnation
of the thousand-headed serpent Ananta or Adiśeṣa ” (Burley 26), others have connected
him with Patañjali “the grammarian and author of the Mahābhāṣya” (Müller 313), the
great commentary on Pāṇini’s work on Classical Sanskrit grammar, the Aṣṭadhyāyī, thus
placing the text around the second century BCE. “Scholars such as R. Garbe and S. N.
Dasgupta maintain that the grammarian and the yoga writer are identical”. On the other
hand, others place it as late as 500CE; however, many agree “that the Yogasūtra is a
product of the second or third century CE” (Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana
42).
Of all the different practices of Yoga that have existed, Patañjali’s Yoga was
considered to be the authoritative text to represent the system of Classical Yoga at the
time the six Darśanas 4 began to be categorized, most likely, because it is the most
thorough text that devotes itself exclusively to the topic of the practice of Yoga.
Furthermore, Patañjali “supplied Yoga with a reasonably homogenous framework that
could stand up against the many rival traditions” (Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga
Darśana 43), as he had a greater focus on the practical application of the system rather
that seeking to present a philosophical treatise in its own right. Instead of propounding a
particular ontology in the text itself, Patañjali largely builds on the ontology of Classical
Sāṃkhya, a system that has very often paired up with Classical Yoga as a consequence of
their similar approaches.

4

Darśana: A philosophical category of the Classical Hindu philosophy literally meaning ‘to view or see’.
The six categories or darśanas that together come to form Classical Hinduism are: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika,
Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and Uttara Mīmāṃsā.
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The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is regarded as the authoritative text of Classical
Sāṃkhya, and “the earliest available text on the Sāṃkhya philosophy”, considered to date
at around the third century CE (Burley 16). While there is no known earlier Sāṃkhya
text, it is generally assumed that the Sāṃkhyakārikā draws from a much older source,
since not only the Yoga system derived from its philosophy, but there is also a wide
range of texts throughout history that have drawn upon its concepts. Proto-Sāṃkhya is an
unorganized pre-philosophical tradition that traces back Sāṃkhyan elements in other
older texts, such as several major Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. While it is
considered by many to come from an earlier theistic philosophy (Nicholson 74), this
conclusion seems to derive from the interpretation of the texts where these elements
appear, for since there is no older Sāṃkhya text, it is impossible to determine the
meaning of those elements in their own right (Krishna 195). In this light, Proto-Sāṃkhya
appears to be the remnants of an ancient philosophy from where other philosophies either
built upon or borrowed from without necessarily implying a complete adherence of these
to the full ontology of the ancient Sāṃkhya, given there was ever such an organized
system in the past.
The ontology of Classical Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhyakārikā) is based on a dualistic model
of “subject and object and which maintains that the fundamental error consists in their
confusion or identification in any form or at any level” (Krishna 202). Sāṃkhya
philosophy describes the universe to be made up of only two independent elements:
puruṣa5 and prakṛti,6 which “are thus two ultimate, eternal and independent principles of

5

Puruṣa is everything that prakṛti is not. In contrast, it is the seer, or draṣṭṛ, that which only has the ability
of seeing, but not the quality of being seen.
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existence. Puruṣas are many, prakṛti is one” (Tiamni 189). The present study will
demonstrate that Patañjali makes very clear that these two elements exist independent
from each other as well as the fact that there is not one puruṣa or transcendental reality
but rather a multitude of seers 7 in sūtra 4.15: “In view of the multiplicity of
consciousness [as opposed] to the singleness of a [perceived] object, both [belong to]
separate levels [of existence]“ (Feurstein, The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali 134), as well as
sūtra 2.22, where he explains that even though the perception or experience of prakṛti
ceases to exist as such for the liberated seer, prakṛti itself does not.
The Yogasūtra of Patañjali, as the name implies, is a Yoga text written in sūtra
style. A sūtra can be translated as ‘thread’; it is a popular style of writing in India, used
by several systems of thought, where the aphorisms are used as a mnemonic device in the
memorization of a particular text. Thus, by definition, a sūtra is concise and accurate,
using the least amount of words possible in order to illustrate a particular point while
maximizing the potential for expounding meaning. The Yogasūtra uses nouns almost
exclusively, and rarely uses verbs. Because of the style and structure of the sūtras, they
are mainly concerned with providing definitions, in many cases, in a very brief manner.
The Yogasūtra is comprised of 196 sūtras or aphorisms, divided into four pādas, or
chapters. The first chapter, samādhipāda, focuses on the different practices that lead to
the attainment of samādhi. The second chapter, sādhanapāda, expands on several of

6

Prakṛti is everything material, even in its most subtle forms, consisting of elements and sense organs, and
is for the sake of puruṣa’s experience and transcendence.
7

Throughout the present analysis the word ‘seer’ will be used as a translation for puruṣa, not to be
confused with the ṛṣis, or ‘ancient seers’.
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those practices and goes deeper into the nature of samādhi. The third chapter,
vibhūtipāda, focuses on the great powers that may arise in the path of Yoga, and the
fourth and final chapter, kaivalyapāda, explores the nature of the journey towards
kaivalya, the final stage of Yoga. The relationships between the different sūtras are not
always linear, are often interconnected, and thus, different connections and relationships
within the text need to be considered.

Defining Īśvara: A New Perspective in the Hermeneutics of Classical Yoga
There are several issues that arise in the endeavor of textual interpretation; from
language and translation, historical and cultural context, to interpretation and application,
thus, it becomes impossible to fully determine the intention and purpose of the original
author, as well as the interpreters of such text, for more often than not, interpretation can
be aligned with an attempt to perpetuate tradition and power. In many instances, since
many commentators, whether intentionally or not, tend to interpret texts in a way that
their work supports either their own personal world-views, or the systems they subscribe
to, a particular text can be interpreted in a myriad of ways depending on what aspect of
the text the commentator chooses to focus on, and which aspects they choose to ignore.
Hence, inaccurate interpretations, even of a single term within one text, can lead to the
inaccurate interpretation of the essence of the text, and come to misrepresent an entire
system of thought, as well as perpetuate the authority of the different allegiances of such
commentators.
There are many words and concepts in the Sanskrit language that do not have a
direct translation into English, thus in many instances, translations have been made in

7

order to accommodate an author’s particular point of view. Indologist Max Müller speaks
of the importance of translation and interpretation in “Sacred Books of the East”, stating
that “we want to know the ancient religions such as they really were, not such as we wish
they should have been” (Müller 636). Therefore, in cases where accuracy in translation is
impossible to achieve, it becomes essential to work towards accurate interpretation,
without making undue assumptions, and most importantly, without trying to fit foreign
concepts into them in an attempt towards understanding.
The first problem that arises is the ambiguity of the term īśvara, for it has been used
throughout history in different contexts and thus conveyed different meanings (see
Chapter 4). While it becomes impossible to know the intention behind Patañjali’s
decision to use such an ambiguous term, it is possible to at least try to understand its
different uses throughout history as an attempt to identify the common use of the term
contemporary to Patañjali, in order to understand the context in which he used this term.
The second problem is the theistic interpretation of the term leading to the translation of
īśvara as God, which has more serious consequences (see page 10).

Thirdly, the

elevation of certain commentaries to be as authoritative, and in some instances, more
authoritative than the original text, as in the case of Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya (see Chapter 2),
perpetuates certain trends as facts, when in reality, they are not part of the original text.
Out of the total 196 sūtras, the term īśvara appears in the following eight sūtras,
and out of those eight, after introducing īśvara, four are dedicated to defining it:
I.23 īśvarapraṇidhānadvā - presents the concept of īśvarapraṇidhāna
I.24 kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣtaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ - describes īśvara
I.25 tatra niratiśayam sarvajñabījam - describes īśvara
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I.26 pūrveṣamapi guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt - describes īśvara
I.27 tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ - describes īśvara and the method of īśvarapraṇidhāna
II.1 tapaḥ svādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ - defines kriyāyoga
II.32 śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ - defines niyama
II.45 samādhisiddhirīśvarapraṇidhānāt - defines the effect of īśvarapraṇidhāna
Patañjali first introduces the term in sūtra I.23: īśvarapraṇidhānādvā, a concept
which appears again in the second book of the Yogasūtra, first in sūtra II.1 as one of the
three elements of kriyāyoga, and then in sūtra II.32 as one of five elements of niyama,
the second limb of Patañjali’s eight-fold path. The term īśvarapraṇidhāna is a compound
of the following two words:
īśvara

able to do, capable of, liable, exposed to, master, lord,
prince, king, mistress, queen, husband, God, the Supreme
Being, the Supreme Soul (ātman), Śiva, one of the Rudras,
the god of love, of a prince (Monier Williams 171).

praṇidhānāt

laying on, fixing, applying, access, entrance, exertion,
endeavor, respectful conduct, attention paid to, profound
religious meditation, abstract contemplation of, vehement
desire, vow, prayer (Monier Williams 660).

Only after ‘īśvara’ and ‘praṇidhānāt’ have been put together do they typically get
translated as ‘devotion to the Lord’ or ‘devotion to God’, thus implying a theistic
interpretation, rather than a more accurate representation of the functionality of the term
within the system (explored further in Chapter 5). According to the following definition,
theism is a “worldview that perceives the orders of existence (physical things, organisms,

9

persons) as dependent for their being and continuance on one self-existent God, who
alone is worthy of worship...Theists hold that God, transcendent creator of the orders,
remains an indivisible unity as he sustains them in accordance with their capacities and
his ultimate purposes” (Bertocci 9102). Such definition implies a God whose existence is
independent from the realities and elements of the universe, as well as a creator and
sustainer of everything that exists. However, the present study will demonstrate that in
Classical Yoga, as in Sāṃkhya, creation “is from prakṛti [nature, the seen] alone without
the assistance of any outside agency. The proximity of puruṣa [spirit, the seer] and
prakṛti is a sufficient condition for the evolution and involution of the world” (Rukmani,
“God/Īśvara in Indian Philosophy” 134). Therefore, the usage of the terms in relation to
the system of Yoga, ‘God’ and ‘theism’, are both deemed as misplaced and misleading,
for they consequently come to affect, and in some instances define, the meaning of the
text and the system as a whole.
The present study proposes that the frequent translation of the term īśvara as ‘God’
presents several problems: first of all, it does not accurately represent the intent of the use
and purpose of the term īśvara as used in the Yogasūtra, specifically obscuring the
interpretation of īśvarapraṇidhāna, a functional aspect of the system. Secondly, it has
directly led to the common understanding of the main distinction between Sāṃkhya and
Yoga as the former being atheistic while the latter theistic, labels that come to
misrepresent both systems. Lastly, it allows for the confusion regarding the path of
Patañjali. It obscures this path of discrimination, separation, involution and isolation
towards liberation, to a point where it can lend itself to be interpreted and accommodated
to fit into other ideologies, thus enabling a syncretic trend that has led to the popular
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understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the divine’. The present study describes Classical
Yoga as an esoteric practice that follows a path of involution towards the pursuit of
liberation; it does not seek a connection with an external reality but rather strives to
separate from it. Thus, the root of the problem resides within the commentarial tradition:
starting with the early theistic interpretation of the term īśvara which led to its translation
as ‘God’, and the subsequent interpretation of its functionality within the system of
Classical Yoga.
Because of many discrepancies and interpolations into the text, particularly
regarding this issue, it becomes crucial to determine the identity and purpose of īśvara in
order to fully understand Patañjali’s system of Yoga, particularly in regards to īśvara’s
placement in the path of Yoga. The present study also attempts to answer the following
questions: If īśvara is defined as an outside agent who has the power to actively get
involved in the world and grant liberation to those who worship him, as some suggest,
what is the purpose of the rest of his very elaborate system? Furthermore, if the path is
understood as a means to interact and merge with an outside agent, which is a common
theistic interpretation, would the meaning of the ultimate goal Patañjali describes, that of
standing in isolation in one’s own nature (YSI.3, YSIV.34),8 not become contradictory
and ultimately obsolete?
The purpose of the present study is threefold: (1) to define the use of the concept of
īśvara in the system of Classical Yoga as found in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, (2) to determine
the theistic/atheistic nature of the concept and therefore the system of Classical Yoga, and

8

YS - yogasūtra (Patañjali)
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(3) to identify the nature of the circumstances that have led to the obscurity of this
subject. The present study attempts to define the concept of īśvara in the context of the
Yogasūtra of Patañjali, through the analysis of Patañjali’s path, while attempting to
identify the source of the many conflicting views regarding this issue. It does not seek to
neither prove nor disprove the actual existence of God in any capacity, but rather focuses
on the presence and relevance of theism within the path Patañjali proposes in his
Yogasūtra.
The present study will follow a textual analysis of the Yogasūtra in its original
Sanskrit in addition to its commentarial traditions, aiming to consider the commentaries
independent of the original text in order to find the discrepancies between the core text
and its commentaries, as well as analyze the commentarial works on the Yogasūtra in
order to identify the hermeneutical trends that have led towards the discrepancies
regarding the nature and purpose of īśvara. In turn, these hermeneutical trends will aid to
establish the spectrum delineated by scholarship regarding the nature and purpose of
īśvara within the Yogasūtra of Patañjali, from utterly useless to predominantly essential,
within which reside a multitude of competing theories, and further attempting to place
īśvara in the appropriate space within this spectrum.
On the one extreme Garbe describes the purpose for the inclusion of the term īśvara
in the Yogasūtra to be an attempt by Patañjali to appeal to both the Vedic9 authorities and

9

Vedic: of the Vedas. This study considers the Vedas to not extend beyond the Saṃhitas, or collections:
Ṛgveda (oldest, chants), Sāmaveda and Yajurveda (Melodies and sacrificial formulas), Atharaveda
(youngest). Some early sources consider only three Vedas, while some scholars consider the Upaniṣads to
be part of the Vedas. Chapter 3 (p. 32) describes the development of Brahmanic (Vedic) and Śramanic
traditions as parallel yet radically different.
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theistic popular beliefs10 (Feuerstein, Philosophy of Classical Yoga 3), thus making his
system of Classical Yoga more appealing, as well as using this as an attempt to elevate
Sāṃkhya philosophy through its association with his Yoga system (Dasgupta, Yoga
Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems 248). On the other extreme of the spectrum there
are scholars such as Vijñānabhikṣu who refer to īśvara in terms of the highest God,
Parameśvara, describing him as the one who is “able to change the world, to bring it into
existence and to make it disappear, just by his desire”. According to his definition īśvara
is thus a creator, preserver and destroyer God (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu” 133), and
moreover, the revealer of the Vedas.
Furthermore,

many

commentaries

often

diverge

in

their

grammatical

understandings of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, which proves to be a very common trend, where
Classical Yoga concepts are accommodated by the commentarial tradition with
incompatible ideas, as an attempt to reconcile Yoga with other more prominent systems
of thought. These inconsistencies can be seen as early as Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya, the first
known commentary of the Yogasūtra, with his doctrine of sattva, which is original to
Vyāsa, and not to Patañjali, as is the understanding of subsequent commentators. This
situation proves to be particularly problematic since the status of Vyāsa’s commentary is
elevated to the authority level of the original text, thus leading these interpolations to be
perpetuated as fact often effecting modern scholarly understandings.
Therefore, the analysis of the present study will cover several levels of interpreting
Patañjali’s Yogasūtras, and the different ways in which these interact. (1) Firstly, the
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Indigenous and/or popular traditions, mostly dealing with strong devotional practices.
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grammatical understanding of the original text, without the influence of the commentarial
tradition. (2) The early commentarial tradition, Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya. (3) The medieval
commentaries of Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu. (4) Modern indigenous scholarship,
particularly the way in which Swami Vivekananda presented Hinduism to the West;
elevating Vedānta as the main philosophy of Hinduism and adapting it for a Christian
audience. (5) Modern Western scholarship, focusing on Orientalists such as Müller and
Deussen. (6) Finally, contemporary scholarship, such as Larson and Feuerstein, among
others, and their respective understanding of the text. Thus, the present study seeks to
explore an issue that has been often neglected, and in many instances, approached with
great misunderstanding and misplaced assumptions, in an attempt to present a new
perspective in the hermeneutics of Classical Yoga.

Description of Chapters
Having stated and briefly explored the different issues that arise when attempting to
define the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, the following chapters will delve deeper
into the matter. The organization of the present study’s chapters is as follows:
Chapter 2, “The Commentarial Tradition”, is an analysis of the commentarial
tradition of Classical Yoga, in an attempt to identify and categorize the different
hermeneutical trends that have led to the obscurity of the subject, introducing prominent
commentators and their trends in order to identify the different issues of translation and
interpretation that arise from these.
Chapter 3, “Deconstructing Hinduism”, as an expansion of Chapter 2, is an analysis
of the underlying reasons for some of these hermeneutical trends, by placing Patañjali’s
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Yogasūtra in the general context of the development of Hinduism, as well as an attempt
to understand the classification of Classical Yoga as a Hindu Darśana, along with its
consequences.
Chapter 4, “The etymology of the term īśvara and its Pre-Classical History”, is a
survey of the pre-classical use of the term īśvara, tracing its origin and use in different
Indian texts throughout history, from its use to denote a worldly lord, to its use as a
personal God, as well as the influence of devotional sectarian practices that have
contributed to its interpretation as God.
While it becomes impossible to know the intention behind Patañjali’s decision to
use such an ambiguous term, it is possible to attempt to understand the context in which
he used it. Chapter 5, “The Path of Classical Yoga: Reading Patañjali without
commentary”, is the product of a grammatical analysis of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra without
relying on the use of commentary, primarily focusing on the translation of the first
chapter, samādhipāda, and a selection of sūtras from the second chapter, sādhanapāda,
as well as deeper grammatical analysis on the sūtras that directly deal with the issue of
īśvara, in order to understand Patañjali’s path of Yoga independent of commentaries, and
the role of īśvara in the system of Classical Yoga exclusively. It contrasts this
interpretation with those of the commentarial tradition from Chapter 2, specifically
addressing the issue of the identity of īśvara in the Yogasūtra, as well as defining the
functionality of īśvarapraṇidhāna in the path Patañjali proposes.
Finally, Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the present study, where the term īśvara
emerges as the representation of an empirical concept and a functional component of the
path of Yoga, rather than an ontological concept per se. Thus, much rather than being or
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representing God, and thus being the determinant for the system of Classical Yoga to be
classified as theistic, īśvara represents the ultimate ideal of the goal of Yoga: a puruṣa
that has never lost its identity to its misidentification with prakṛti, and as such, it
functions as a practical and experiential tool, by being an archetype of this ultimate
reality, providing the yogi with a direct experience of puruṣa, where he is able to get a
direct glimpse of its true nature. The role of īśvara is therefore akin to the instruction
manual Patañjali presents: a series of practical tools that facilitate a series of experiences
which lead towards an ultimate goal: kaivalya, or isolation of self.
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CHAPTER 2
THE COMMENTARIAL TRADITION

Although the sūtra style presents sets of rules or philosophical points of views in a
way which facilitates for strict memorization, thus preserving the identity and accuracy of
a text, it comes along with a commentarial tradition that, while necessary for the
understanding of the sūtras, allows for interpretation - or a series of interpretations - that
can at times depart far away from the original text and furthermore be taken as an
authoritative text itself. As commentators attempt to reconcile the text they are
commenting on with their other areas of studies as well as their own personal viewpoints
and philosophical and/or religious beliefs, the product of these attempts is a new text that
is taken as an authority in the field and thus used by subsequent commentators as an
authoritative source for their own work, in many cases without questioning the motives
behind the work of these previous commentators, contributing to the diluting of certain
concepts as they perpetuate conflicting ideas and confusion. In most cases the end
product is an authoritative work that is a commentary of a commentary of a commentary;
a work that is the result of an amalgamation of conflicting ideologies borrowed from
other schools of thought which yet leaves no specific trace of their origin and the reasons
for having been included in such a way, thus leaving the only conclusion of being an
attempt at reconciliation due to the commentators’ own personal motives.
Chapter 2 is an analysis of the hermeneutics of Classical Yoga, focusing on the
identity, purpose and use of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, from translation and
interpretation of the term itself, as well as the commentators’ theistic/atheistic
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classification of the text as a whole. It attempts to identify and categorize the different
hermeneutical trends that have led towards the discrepancies regarding the nature and
purpose of īśvara, covering the different categories of interpreting Patañjali’s Yogasūtra,
and the different ways in which these interact both between each other, as well as with
the original text. The chapter addresses two of the main issues that arise in the endeavor
of textual interpretation described in Chapter 1: firstly, the theistic interpretation of the
term leading to the translation of īśvara as God, and secondly, the elevation of certain
commentaries to be as authoritative, and in some instances, more authoritative than the
original text, as in the case of Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya.
The Commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga can be divided into 5 different
categories, according to time period and geographical location. (1) The early
commentarial tradition, dating back to the 7-8th century CE (Woods xx), with the first
commentary of the Yogasūtra, Vyāsa’s Yogabhāṣya. (2) The medieval commentaries of
Vācaspatimiśra’s Tattvavaiśāradī of the 9th century CE (Woods xxi) and Vijñānabhikṣu’s
Yogavārttika of the 16th century CE (Rukmani, “Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu” 3). (4)
Modern indigenous scholarship, of the late 19th century to early 20th century CE, with the
works of Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan. (5) Modern Western scholarship, focusing on
Orientalists such as Müller, Deussen and Garbe. (6) Finally, contemporary scholarship,
such as Eliade, Larson and Feuerstein, among others. While each author has, for the most
part, a particular position on the issue of īśvara, there are certain trends that are
particularly prevalent to certain time periods and locations. The underlying causes for
these trends will be addressed in Chapter 3, as it becomes necessary to place the text in
the context of Classical Hinduism, and its categorization as a Hindu Darśana, for the
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present study argues that some of these trends are directly related to the distinction
between Classical yoga and its ‘partner’ Darśana, Sāṃkhya, as the former being theistic
and the later atheistic.

Vyāsa’s Doctrine of Sattva
One of the elements not obviously defined by Patañjali is the degree of activity and
involvement of īśvara in the yogi’s path towards realization. If īśvara is a puruṣa (I.24),
and thus by definition inactive within prakṛti (Majumdar 52), in which way or form does
he indeed “favor” the yogi due to “[this yogin’s] profound-desire” (Vyāsa qtd. in Woods
48)? Vyāsa’s attempt to solve this problem, which was fully accepted and supported by
Vācaspatimiśra and Vijñānabhikṣu, is by explaining that īśvara, “by its own nature,
cannot intervene in the spatio-temporal processes of Nature”, therefore, he must acquire
“a medium through which He can exert his influence”: perfect sattva11 (Feuerstein, “The
Concept of God in Classical Yoga” 386). Vyāsa thus considers īśvara to be “a special
kind of Self” (Vyāsa qtd. in Woods 49) who is “at all times whatsoever liberated” (qtd. in
Woods 50) and, “through his perfect sattvic state, active in the world as a remover of
obstacles” (qtd. in Woods 62).
Vācaspatimiśra presents a yet stronger Brahmanic 12 position than Vyāsa, as he
legitimizes the omniscience of īśvara by the authoritativeness of the Vedas, and

11

Sattva: Prakṛti or nature is made of the interaction between three qualities or guṇas: Sattva, rajas, and
tamas. Sattva “connotes the bright, light, buoyant, wise, good, transparent aspects of nature” (Potter 3709).
12

Brahmanic: of the Brahmins, or India’s priestly [and highest] caste. A tradition that is rooted in the
Vedas, and is characterized by being exoteric, this-worldly, and intensely ritualistic.
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delegitimizes the authoritativeness of other authors, such as the Buddha and the Sage
Kāpila, by describing their work as “pseudo-sacred-words” and “deceitful”, hence
elevating the Brahmanic tradition as the only legitimate source of authority
(Vācaspatimiśra qtd. in Woods 57). He not only agrees with the doctrine of sattva
proposed by Vyāsa, stating that īśvara “reflects, and assumes a sattva of perfect quality”
(qtd. in Woods 52), as well as the fact that the proof of īśvara’s existence and ability to
interact in this world to be his revelation of the śāstras or “sacred books”, “[which] are
composed by the īśvara” (qtd. in Woods 53), but he further validates and strengthens
these positions, clearly perceiving Vyāsa as the highest authority in understanding
Patañjali’s Yogasūtra. He then sustains this point by going back around and stating that,
since “there is no possibility of error or deceit” in a state of “perfect sattva”, it “[then] is
established that sacred books have their proof in the perfect quality of His sattva” (qtd. in
Woods 54). Hence, he uses a circular argument in order to prove īśvara’s appropriation
of sattva: the proof of īśvara’s omniscience is in the infallibility of the śāstras, and the
authority of the śāstras is in the omniscience of īśvara. According to Dasgupta, Vyāsa
had resorted to the śāstra argument as proof of īśvara’s sattva due to the fact that he had
no other way of substantiating his position, for his doctrine of sattva “had no place in the
system” (Dasgupta, Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought
249).
Feuerstein challenges Vyāsa’s doctrine of sattva by asking: “If liberation signifies
the unconditional transcendence of the sattva (together with all other qualities of Nature,
and thus Nature itself), then, how can the Lord be perpetually associated with a sattva
without forsaking his condition of Freedom?” (Feuerstein, “The Concept of God in
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Classical Yoga” 393). Unfortunately, he concludes there is no answer for this question.
“Vyāsa’s (YBh I.24)13 answer is a dogmatic assertion that the association of the Lord
with a pure sattva is beginningless”, Vācaspatimiśra (TV I.24)14 states “the perfect sattva
of the Lord can neither be conceived nor inferred” and considers its proof to be the
scriptures which he believes are revealed by īśvara himself, while “Bhoja (RM I.23)15
bluntly argues that one should not ask this question, because the logical problem involved
is one of what we would call the chicken-and-egg variety” (Feuerstein, “The Concept of
God in Classical Yoga” 394).
On the surface, Vyāsa’s theory might be a viable solution to explain īśvara’s
activity in the world, however, it appears to be a pure fabrication, as it makes no
reference to the original text, which he uses to prove his presentation of īśvara as an
active and powerful agent in the evolution of both prakṛti and man towards realization.
As “the authorities of Classical Yoga ultimately make this doctrine a matter of belief”
(Feuerstein, “The Concept of God in Classical Yoga” 394), it becomes clear from
comparing the original text and Vyāsa’s commentary that Vyāsa’s doctrine of sattva,
however a clever attempt to solve an important discrepancy, is original to Vyāsa, and not
Patañjali. This distinction, however, is not implicitly made by neither Vyāsa or by
subsequent commentators, and thus it is regarded as Vyāsa’s clarification of Patañjali’s
work, rather than a doctrine that is exclusively original to him. Thus, Vyāsa’s doctrine of

13

YBh - yogabhāṣya (Vyāsa)

14

TV - tattvavaiśāradī (Vacaspatimiśra)

15

RM - rājamārṭāṇda (Bhoja)
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sattva has been used in subsequent commentaries as if it was original to Patañjali, and as
a consequence, perpetuated as fact.

Vijñānabhikṣu’s Syncretic Trend
Vijñānabhikṣu is the most prominent exponent of the syncretic trend in the
hermeneutics of Classical Yoga. A yogi at heart (Matilal 9595) at a time in which, “in the
philosophical field, Vedānta16 was at its height and on the other hand, in the religious
field, Bhakti was gaining supremacy”, Vijñānabhikṣu attempts to reconcile his personal
beliefs with the current trends “in order to establish Yoga in a Vedāntic [and Bhakta]
atmosphere” (Rukmani, Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu 8). He speaks of īśvara in terms
of the highest God, Parameśvara, stating that he “is able to change the world, to bring it
into existence and to make it disappear, just by his desire”. Īśvara in his view is thus a
creator, preserver and destroyer God (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick
Philosopher” 133).
Rukmani does not consider Vijñānabhikṣu to be “faithful to the text he professes to
comment on”, for he is too intent in “conceding a bhakti viewpoint into the Yoga
philosophy”, going against the path Patañjali describes in the sūtras themselves (further
detailed in Chapter 5) as well as Vyāsa’s commentary. He further attempts to substantiate
his theistic and bhakti views by explaining “sūtras I.23-24 in terms of how īśvara can
bring about quickly asaṃprajñāta-yoga and kaivalya 17 for the devotee who practices

16

Vedānta: Veda + anta. Translates to End of the Vedas. Main collection of texts: Upaniṣads. As a
Darśana: Uttara Mīmāṃsā.
17

Asaṃprajñāta-yoga and kaivalya: asaṃprajñāta is the highest form of samādhi before attaining
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bhakti”; elevating the functionality of īśvara in the text, through īśvarapraṇidhāna, as
essential for achieving liberation (Rukmani, Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu Vol.2 xi) and
“emphatically dismisses Sāṃkhya” and its position that “liberation (kaivalya) can be
achieved through reasoning” (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick Philosopher” 135).
The result of his attempts to reconcile these different systems of thought ultimately
misrepresents the Bhakti, Vedānta and Yoga traditions, for, Rukmani states, “in his hands
Advaita Vedānta, Yoga, and Bhakti all get transformed” (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A
Maverick Philosopher” 143).
Another important issue of interpretation is when a commentator presents
conflicting views, either within the same publication or in their different works. This
situation appears in many cases and at different levels. On the milder side, there are
commentators, such as Feuerstein, who translate the term īśvara as ‘Lord’ yet speaks of
him in theistic terms. Then there are those, such as Eliade, who actually use the term
‘God’ as a translation of īśvara, however giving the term God a new definition in this
context that is more in line with the ontology the Yogasūtra follows. On the most extreme
cases, there are those, such as Dasgupta, who have complete contradictory views of the
identity and purpose of īśvara in different publications.
Feuerstein, in spite of considering the common translation of īśvara by the “totally
ambiguous word ‘god’” as problematic, for the īśvara “is neither the creator, upholder or
destroyer of the universe, nor is he judge over good and evil, right and wrong, nor
supreme arbiter of human fates” (Feuerstein, The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali xi), his choice

kaivalya, or isolation of self, the goal of Patañjala Yoga.
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of language is not always in line with this statement. For example, when speaking of
saṃprajñāta samādhi described in YS I.17, Feuerstein states that the cittavṛttinirodaḥ
(cessation of mind processes) is not enough to attain this level of samādhi, supporting his
argument with sūtra II.45, samādhisiddhirīśvarapraṇidhānāt (perfection of samādhi
comes from īśvarapraṇidhāna), taken out of context, and declaring: “It appears that the
‘grace’ of the ‘lord’ (īśvara) is also required” (Feuerstein, The Yogasūtra of Patañjali
37). His choice and use of the words ‘grace’ and ‘lord’ in this context appear to have a
very theistic, and rather Christian tone.
Eliade states īśvara “is not a creator god, for the cosmos, life, and humanity
proceed from the primordial substance, prakṛti”. For him, īśvara “plays a rather minor
role” as an alternative path for “devotional yogins” (YS I.23). Despite his new definition
of the term God, Eliade uses the term God as a translation for īśvara (Eliade, “Yoga”
9896). This proves to be very confusing for those readers who have a preconceived idea
of the meaning of God. The introduction of a new and different definition for the term
‘God’ does not suffice in redefining the understanding of a word loaded with a very
specific meaning for such a large population.
Dasgupta presents very different views regarding the nature and purpose of īśvara
in three different books. In Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian
Thought Dasgupta does not portray īśvara as a necessary intelligence for the functioning
of prakṛti, stating that the mere proximity of puruṣa to prakṛti is enough to spark and
sustain evolution, and the doctrine of karma being enough to sustain order in the world
(Dasgupta 235-236). As īśvara does not quite fit “its system of metaphysics” it is “but
loosely introduced, more as a matter of traditional faith than as having a place in the
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system of philosophy. He is introduced as only one of the alternative objects of
concentration”, albeit an object of superior importance over all others, for īśvara can
“remove the obstacles and make the attainment of the goal of the yogin much easier”
(Dasgupta 246).
In A History of Indian Philosophy, Dasgupta portrays a much more active īśvara, as
an “intelligent Being who should help the course of evolution” (Dasgupta 260). He does
not consider īśvara to be the creator of prakṛti but rather a puruṣa himself, although one
who is able to disturb “the equilibrium of the prakṛti”, whose by his “permanent will...
the guṇas follow naturally an intelligent course of evolution for the service of the best
interests of the puruṣas”. Furthermore, this īśvara helps prakṛti “to follow an intelligent
order by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order of the world is
brought about” (Dasgupta 260). Thus īśvara here is not only the initial trigger of
evolution but fully active in the world, the one who controls the order of the guṇas and
the distribution of the “fruits of karma”.
In Yoga as philosophy and Religion he begins to use the terms īśvara and God
interchangeably. He does acknowledge “that the Bhāṣya 18 or the sūtras [do not] ever
mention Him as having anything to do with the controlling of the modifications of the
prakṛti by removing the barriers”, but he states, “all the latter commentators agree in
holding him responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of prakṛti’s
development” (Dasgupta 87). While he states that “it is on account of God that we can do
good or bad actions and thus acquire merit or demerit”, on the very next line he
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Bhāṣya: commentary.
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continues: “Of course God is not active and cannot cause any motion in prakṛti”
(Dasgupta 87). He concludes that somehow he accomplishes this “in such a way that he
stands ultimately responsible for the removal of all obstacles” in the development of both
prakṛti and man, so that perhaps he is not fully active, but can somehow have an effect in
the world (Dasgupta 88).
Ultimately, in his “God in Yoga” chapter, he presents Yoga as karmayoga,
jñānayoga, and bhaktiyoga,19 the last of which he declares to be the “easiest means of
attaining salvation” (Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion 159). In this book he
presents a fully theistic and Vedic notion of īśvara, as the source of the Vedas and able to
preside over the laws of karma, and who, “just as a king, ...punishes or rewards people as
they deserve” (160). He further interprets īśvarapraṇidhāna in full bhakti style: “By
devotion (bhakti) īśvara is drawn towards the devotee ... and by his grace he removes all
obstructions of illness, etc ... So for a person who can love or adore īśvara, this is the
easiest course of attaining samādhi” (161).

It thus becomes impossible to fully

comprehend Dasgupta’s point of view regarding the identity of īśvara, for it is ever
changing.

Issues with the Functionality of Īśvarapraṇidhāna
When coming at odds with attempting to reconcile a theistic interpretation of
īśvarapraṇidhāna with a strict dualistic ontology, some scholars, such as Garbe, have
simply attempted to either downplay īśvara’s role or make away with the extent of

19

The Bhagavadgītā describes Yoga as being of three types: karmayoga, jñānayoga, and bhaktiyoga.
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īśvara’s functionality in the Yoga system entirely. Garbe considers īśvara to have been
included by Patañjali in order to appease the Vedic authorities and elevate his work in an
atmosphere where theism prevailed. (Garbe, “Outlines of a History of Indian Philosophy”
588). For Zaehner, īśvara appears as a disposable aid in the yogi’s path, having been
introduced “for no other purpose than to help the soul towards isolation”, most likely
being “borrowed from one of the current theistic systems”, once “this purpose has been
served, the God is discarded and the yogin passes beyond him to the real business of
mental concentration, the achievement of kaivalya or ‘isolation’”

(Zaehner 127).

Rukmani considers īśvara to be “only one among many supports in meditation”, having
“been accommodated in a backhanded manner into Yoga philosophy by Patañjali”, for it
does not seem to be compatible with the rest of the system (Rukmani, “God/Īśvara in
Indian Philosophy” 134).
Müller states that Patañjali’s use of the term īśvara was not such a source of debate
in the past, or at least there is no evidence in there being a philosophical debate on the
matter (Müller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 319). He considers
īśvarapraṇidhāna to be an optional path (Müller, The Six Systems of Yoga Philosophy
308), and the inclusion of term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra to not necessarily be a
determinant in qualifying the whole text as theistic, as he defines īśvara as “originally no
more than one of the many souls, or rather Selves or Puruṣas, but one that has never been
associated with or implicated in metempsychosis, supreme in every sense, yet of the same
kind as all other Puruṣas. The idea of other Puruṣas obtaining union with him could
therefore never have entered Patañjali's head”. According to Müller, “the highest object
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of the yogin was freedom, aloneness, aloofness, or self-centeredness” (Müller, The Six
Systems of Yoga Philosophy 325).
Yet, īśvarapraṇidhāna is not mentioned only once, but in three different places in
the text: first introduced as an alternate path of meditation in YSI.23, then as one of the
three elements of kriyāyoga in YSII.1, and lastly as one of the five niyama, or
observances of aṣṭaṅgayoga in YSII.32 and YSII.45. It is not mentioned loosely in three
places, but rather as part of three different paths the Yogasūtra puts forward. Although it
seems more manageable to label īśvara as not a relevant or important part of the Yoga
system, this proves to be as much a fabrication and as inaccurate and misleading as
considering īśvara to be synonymous with God or Brahman. This, most likely, is the
result of a reaction to both a strong syncretic and theistic trend, both of which have been
present, to a certain extent, since the time of Vyāsa.
While some commentators attempt to define īśvara as a philosophical concept and
its placement in the Yoga ontology, others have focused on the more practical aspects of
the concept. According to Burley, Patañjali’s very definition of īśvara as a “‘special self’
(puruṣa-viśeṣa) is crucial, as it implies that īśvara is not to be regarded as constituting a
distinct ontological category” (Burley 50), but rather in the experiential realm (Feurstein,
Classical Yoga 3). “Considering the distinctly pragmatic orientation of his Yoga”,
(Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana 84) Patañjali must have included the
concept of īśvara in his work because, according to Eliade, “īśvara corresponded to an
experiential reality” resulting from a long tradition of yogic techniques. Thus, īśvara
represents the ideal for the yogi to reach, “an archetype of the yogin - a macroyogin”,
whose concept might have been inherited from his position as “a patron of certain yogic
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sects” (Eliade, Yoga 75). Thus, according to Whicher “īśvara might have met primarily
psychological and pedagogical needs rather than providing a purely ontological category”
(Whicher, The Integrity of the Yoga Darśana 85).

Conclusion
The conflicting variety of not only different translations and interpretations but
different approaches to defining the term īśvara as well as its placement and function
within the Yoga system has, on the one hand, contributed to the many misconceptions on
the subject, since, without much further and deeper investigation, and a full
understanding of the system as a whole, it can lend itself to people picking and choosing
whatever views are in agreement with their own. On the other hand, it is a testimony of
the wealth of the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga, one which, by attempting to
peel away the layers of intentions, traditions and allegiances, is available to potentially
illuminate on the subject rather than obscure it.
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CHAPTER 3
DECONSTRUCTING HINDUISM

The very nature of the sūtra style of writing prompts a dependency on commentary
which, while at times can be enlightening, in many cases, it can depart so far away from
the original text that it creates a series of contradictions and discrepancies that further
obscure the essence of its meaning. Since the many approaches and discrepancies
regarding the identity and purpose of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra are not
arbitrary, it is not only important to understand its nature and functionality within the
constraints of the original text (see Chapter 5), but it also becomes imperative to identify
the circumstances that have led to the numerous approaches and discrepancies that have
contributed to the obscurity of this topic.
After reviewing the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga and the most
prominent hermeneutical trends that arise from them in the previous Chapter, the next
step in this analysis is to place both philosophy and term within the context of the
development of Hinduism, as well as attempting to understand the underlying meaning of
the classification of Classical Yoga as a Hindu Darśana, along with its consequences.
Hence, Chapter 3, as an expansion of Chapter 2, is an analysis of the underlying reasons
for some of the hermeneutical trends that have led towards the discrepancies regarding
the nature and purpose of īśvara, in order to fully understand them, instead of simply
dismissing certain interpretations and labeling as incorrect.
The catalyst for the syncretic trend that plays an essential role in the
misrepresentation of Patañjali’s path of Yoga is a homogenizing trend that primarily
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arises from a necessity to perpetuate Vedic authority that starts as a reaction against the
rise of the Upaniṣadic movement. Further, this homogenizing trend is then continued by
the need to categorize Hinduism into a cohesive system with agreeable components,
arising from the necessity to organize against the rise of traditions, such as Jainism, but
particularly Buddhism, that vehemently denied the authority of the Vedas. This gave birth
to the ambiguous categorization of the āstikas and the nāstikas, the agreers and the
deniers, which are directly tied to the emergence of the six Darśanas, or orthodox
systems of though, as the philosophies that constitute Classical Hinduism. This
homogenizing trend is further strengthened by the desire to elevate Hinduism as a world
religion as a reaction against the negative depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian
missionaries during the British colonialism of India, which, further strengthens Vedic
authority and ultimately legitimizes Hinduism as a world religion, finally emerging not
only as a homogenous system but further presented, in many instances, as a monotheistic
religion, and thus, elevated to the authority of the Abrahamic religions.
While there are advocates of both sides of the spectrum, “the idea of Hindu unity is
neither a timeless truth nor a fiction wholly invented by the British to regulate and control
their colonial subjects”, the later which is caused by “tendentious readings based on a
modern tendency to homogenize and oversimplify pre-modern Indian history”
(Nicholson 2). The present study agrees with the theory that the use of Hinduism as a
religious term is not considered to have been in use until after India’s medieval period
(Nicholson 196). Hence, it is more aligned with the view that the homogenizing trend
was an indigenous trend that developed slowly throughout centuries, and that eventually
was perpetuated and strengthened as a reaction to foreign control and influences.
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“The word ‘Hinduism’ is loaded with historical and political resonances, ... with
proponents and detractors, open to varied interpretations” (Nicholson 1), demonstrating
to be much more complex than a religion or a set of philosophies. It is a multiplicity of
intertwined world-views in constant interaction with each other, agreeing and
disagreeing, approving and disproving. From exoteric rituals and esoteric practices, oral
traditions and ancient texts, familial lineages and popular celebrations, all of these come
together to form what has come to be labeled as Hinduism. From its heterogeneous nature
arises the need to reconcile the different conflicting ideologies and practices that
comprise it. While this approach is perfectly acceptable and understandable for
someone’s personal practice in order to form their own particular set of beliefs and
world-views, in academia, it presents a very problematic situation. It thus becomes the
scholar’s responsibility to be able to understand different ideologies in their own right,
abstaining as much as possible from the necessity to resolve the many differences that
will arise, but rather being able to understand and embrace the uniqueness of the myriad
of traditions.

Brahmanism vs. Śramanism
In spite of the many proposers of the concept that Modern Hinduism can be traced
all the way back to the Vedas, and perhaps beyond, in an unbroken line of transmission,
there is a clear divergence in the intention and practice between the Vedic and the
Upaniṣadic traditions.

From the two main classifications in the development of

philosophy and religion in India, the former belongs to the Brahmanic tradition and the
latter to the Śramanic tradition. Garbe considers Śramanic traditions to have developed
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parallel to the Brahmanic tradition in India “as lineages that, having begun with an
individual or small group of philosopher-sages, then followed a line of descent running
from guru to disciple. Over time, because a single teacher can have several disciples, a
number of lineages would tend to develop”, and as these were oral traditions, in time,
they gave rise to a number of different systems of thought which held certain
commonalities, such as Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Upaniṣads, and Buddhism (Burley 38).
The main general distinction between Brahmanic and Śramanic traditions is their
contrasting paths and goals. The intention of Brahminic practices is focused on rituals for
the maintenance of the order of the universe (ṛta) by sacrifice to the gods, as well as
rituals that sought to maintain order within nature and society, being conducted and thus
controlled by the Brahmin or priestly caste. “Centered around the household fire
sacrifice” (Herman 52), this was a path towards prosperity, both material (food, wealth,
etc) and immaterial (after life in Heaven - svārga) in this world (Herman 54), rather than
a vehicle towards transcending it. Furthermore, the source of wisdom in the Brahmanic
tradition is external, and thus ‘heard’, instead of realized.
Revelation in Hinduism is of two categories; śrūti and smṛti. Śrūti is direct
revelation, literally meaning ‘heard’ (Dhavamony, “Revelation in Hinduism” 163), while
smṛti is considered indirect or secondary, as it is revelation based on memory of śrūti
(Dhavamony, “Revelation in Hinduism” 164). The Vedas are considered apauruṣeya, or
impersonal śrūti (Hiltebeitel 3994) as its wisdom was literally ‘heard’ by the ancient
seers or ṛṣis of India in the form of speech, or Vāk, and transmitted orally for centuries
(Dhavamony, “Hindu Spirituality” 10). Thus revelation is of utmost importance, as it is
considered to reveal truths that would be impossible to attain otherwise. Even though
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there are supernatural elements attributed to the ṛṣis (Dhavamony, “Revelation in
Hinduism” 166), they are not considered to be the authors of the Vedas, but rather
passive transmitters of information (Watson 36). The revelation of the Vedas, therefore,
is extrinsic to the ṛṣis that received it, which, implied by the term śrūti (heard), came to
them in the form of sound or words.
While the ṛṣis are the witnesses or receptors of such revelation, the source is not
always as clear as it is, for example, it the Abrahamic religions. At the time of the early
Vedas the ṛṣis did not seem to have a concept of a Supreme Being or creator. The gods
and myths seem to arise from the minds of people who were in awe at the powers of the
universe, who in an attempt to explain and control the world around them, “imagined that
each of the great provinces of the universe was directed and animated by its own separate
deity” (Muir 339). The gods were seen as personified representations of the powers of the
universe, embodying the qualities of the elements they represented. The gods, as the ṛṣis,
are seen as intermediaries, albeit more powerful, between men and the underlying power
of the universe.
In this passage from the Ṛgveda (10.129), known as the Hymn of creation, it is
obvious that even then they did not fully understand the origin of the universe, nor did
they attempt to reach a definite conclusion. There is an understanding, however, that the
gods were not the creators, since they were created themselves after the creation of the
universe, and furthermore, not capable to solve the mysteries of the universe.
There was neither nonentity nor entity; there was no atmosphere nor sky above…
There were impregnating powers and mighty forces, a self-supporting principle
beneath, and energy aloft. Who knows, who here can declare, whence has sprung,
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whence, this creation? The gods are subsequent to the formation of this
[universe]; who then know hence it arose? From what this creation arose, and
whether [any one] made it or not – He who in the highest heaven is its ruler, he
verily knows, or [even] he does not know. (qtd. in Muir 345)
The second line suggests a very abstract conception of Brahman, a powerful
energy that supports and sustains the universe. “The name ‘Brahman’ initially meant any
sacred or magical formula. As time passed by, ‘Brahman’ came to be identified, not with
the words or chants that conjured up the gods and their power but with the Power itself”
(Herman 62). But the concept of Brahman as unattached from Vedic ritual is not fully
developed until later, in the development of the Brāhmanas (Hiltebeitel 3991). The last
line suggests that perhaps there is no creator; for if the highest God does not know about
the origin of creation, creation could have preceded Him as well.
In many instances Brahman is translated as ‘God’, which can present as an
obstacle in the search of a definition. Since many assumptions are made by the use of this
word, the result can be of inaccuracy and confusion. In many instances Brahman is
perceived as a deity, therefore, early Vedic religion is seen as polytheistic, being centered
on a pantheon of anthropomorphic deities. In this view, the word ‘God’ for Brahman is
easily confused with the word ‘gods’ for the deities. Also to be considered is the fact that
in the Vedas, several different gods are regarded as the source of knowledge and creation.
However, also found within the Vedas are statements that explain that in the end, all gods
are the same, “They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni; and (he is) the celestial wellwinged Garutmat. Sages name variously that which is but One” (Muir 342).
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In time, many of these early deities that the ṛṣis received the śrūti from “would
disappear eventually or take secondary place in the Hindu pantheon” (Dhavamony,
“Revelation in Hinduism” 166). However, there is still a focus on their power and its
ability to interact in the maintenance of the universe (Muir 341), which towards the later
parts of the Ṛgveda allows the Brahmins to directly engage with that underlying energy
or power during the action of ritual. This power behind all elements of the universe, that
can be interacted with during Vedic ritual, begins to be identified independently from
attachments, leading to be conceived as the Absolute. “Stripped of mythical and
ritualistic elements, it becomes identified with the universal Self (Brahman) or the
Absolute” (Dhavamony, “Revelation in Hinduism” 180). Thus “the stage was set for
seeking solutions not by turning outwardly to the gods, whether with priestly help and
sacrifices or not, but by turning within oneself to where Brahman resides” (Herman 64),
beginning the transition from the exoteric practices of the Vedas towards the esoteric
practices of the Upaniṣads.
With a clear shift from exoteric to esoteric practice and intention from the Vedas to
the Upaniṣadic movement, the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, a transitional text between the
Āranyakas and Upaniṣads, presents the intention of text as being very different from the
Vedas: “Lead me from the unreal to the real. Lead me from darkness to light. Lead me
from death to immortality” (Prabhavanada and Manchester 93). Long gone is the desire
to connect with external gods and the need to control the world through ritual. The focus
is internal, the intention individual, as the goal shifts from attaining prosperity in this
world and ensuring after-life in svārga to transcending this world through self-realization
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and thus achieving liberation from the bondage of saṃsāra. It is thus a declaration for the
quest towards knowledge, truth and liberation.
Some stories in the Upaniṣads illustrate a clear break from the authority of
Brahminism. The following story questions the validity of the caste system as prescribed
in the Ṛgveda. The significance of this is that as part of the Vedic dharma is questioned,
it opens the possibility to question the whole of the Veda. In the Chandogya Upaniṣad
there is the story of a young boy who asks his mother about his caste, as he wants to
study the Vedas. His mother, who was a servant, tells her son to call himself by his given
name, clearly stating the irrelevance of his caste. When the boy expresses his desire to
study the Vedas to a teacher, he is questioned on his caste. The boy repeats what his
mother told him, to which his teacher responds: “None but a true Brahmin would have
spoken thus. Go and fetch the fuel, for I will teach you. You have not swerved from the
truth” (Prabhavanada and Manchester 74–75). And so, the teacher accepts him as a
student regardless of his non-Brahmin caste. Since caste is determined by birth, not by
attitude or action, according to this view, acting as a Brahmin could lead to be accepted
as one, presenting a clear break in tradition.

The Caste System and the Monopoly of the Brahmins
Since the concept of caste as it is deeply ingrained in Indian society and religion,
it is therefore essential in understanding their development. The four basic castes or
varṇas, directly related to occupation and status, are inherited and permanent. These are
the Brahmins, or priestly caste, the Kṣatriya, or warrior caste, the Vaiśya, or merchant
caste and the Śudra, or servant caste (Herman 52). There are also people who do not
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belong to any caste and are therefore considered to be lower than the Śudras; these as the
non-caste and the untouchables. Throughout the years many have attempted to abolish
the caste system, and while it has been possible to create some progress against the
discrimination of the lower castes, the system itself still stands in India today. The caste
system is so hard to dissolve mainly because of the fact that it is described in the Vedas
as part of the dharma, or duty. As it is in the Vedas, and the Vedas are śrūti, as the Vedas
are considered by many to be absolute truth, so is the concept and implementation of the
caste system; hence observing the caste system is part of Vedic dharma.
The only caste that was allowed to learn and perform the various Vedic rituals
was the Brahmin caste. Furthermore, only the next two lower castes, the Kṣatriya and
Vaiśya had access to the rituals through the Brahmins. The Śudra, the non-caste and the
untouchables were not allowed to be part of the Vedic rituals at all (Herman 52). One of
the problems this presents, is that a large number of the population had no access to any
opportunity of prosperity, the other, is that the population that had access to it was forced
to use the Brahmins as intermediaries. Considering the fact that the household rituals
were intended for the assurance of prosperity, along with the fact that the Brahmins were
the only vehicle towards such prosperity, the Brahmins came to be extremely powerful.
“The religion became power oriented, excessively ritualistic, priest dominated and
aristocratic” (Herman 63); the Brahmins were no longer just ‘intermediaries’, but rather
the administrators and proprietors of the religion.
The attempt to preserve Brahmanic authority prompts a homogenizing trend in
India that inspired the work of philosophers such as Vijñānabhikṣu, who “claimed that,
properly understood, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta and Nyāya were in essence different
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aspects of a single, well-coordinated philosophical outlook”, dismissing their abysmal
differences as a mere “misunderstanding” (Nicholson 3). The Vedic saṃhitas, with the
designation of śrūti, were of the highest authority since they were considered revelation.
The authority of the Brahmins, as well as that of the saṃhitas, led to a tendency of
connecting smṛti works to the philosophy of the Vedas to be perceived as “an
authoritative addition to the Vedas” in order to elevate the validity of the work (Minor 1).
Furthermore, the Vedic solution against the perceived threat of the rise of the Upaniṣadic
movement was to absorb the new movement into the Vedic canon, renaming it Vedānta,
literally meaning the end of the Veda, hence reducing it to being commentaries on the
Vedas, as opposed to being a movement in its own right, even though it clearly presents
an opposingly different philosophy, world-view, purpose, and goal than those of the
Vedas.

The Six Darśanas Strengthening the Homogeneity Trend
The homogenizing trend that arises from the need to reconcile the Vedic tradition
and the Upaniṣadic movement in order to perpetuate Brahmin authority was further
continued and strengthened when once again Vedic authority was questioned. “The age
of the Buddha [563-483BC] represents the great springtide of philosophic spirit in India”
(Radhakrishnan and Moore 349), as its propositions stimulated a dialogue between the
many different existing philosophies that continued for centuries, and eventually gave
rise to Classical Hinduism. As “the conservative schools were compelled to codify their
views and set forth logical defenses for them, .... all logical attempts to gather the floating
conceptions of the world into some great general ideas were regarded as darśanas. This
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conception led to the view that the apparently isolated and independent systems were
really members of a larger historical plan” (Radhakrishnan and Moore 349).
The philosophies that are considered to recognize the validity of the Vedas are
labeled āstika, or ‘agreer’, and are further categorized within the six Darśanas, or
‘views’, while those which are considered to not accept the Vedas are labeled as nāstika,
or ‘denier’, and include Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka. Only after the late medieval
period “it became almost universally accepted that there was a fixed group of Indian
philosophies in basic agreement with one another and standing together against
Buddhism and Jainism” (Nicholson 3). The reductionist and absolutistic categorization of
multiple and widely different philosophies as ‘āstika’ inevitably implies a reference to
Vedic authority, “falsely suggests a uniformity concerning the importance that was
placed by Classical Indian philosophers upon one’s attitude to Vedic authority, and
serves to mask the diversity of philosophical positions within each of the broad religious
categories” (Burley 2). Since “the acceptance of the Veda implies that all the systems
have drawn from a common reservoir of thought” (Radhakrishnan and Moore 353), the
emergence of the six Darśanas further strengthened the homogeneity trend.
Causing further problems is the translation of the terms āstika and nāstika as
orthodox and heterodox, for they have come to be commonly known, in several instances,
that what they agree with and deny is the existence of God. Therefore, it leads to the
orthodox systems to be understood as theistic, allowing for the atheism of the unorthodox
systems. Orthodoxy in this context does not mean the adherence to a particular doctrine
such as the belief in God, but only focuses on the acceptance of the authority Vedas.
Furthermore, “atheism in the Indian context does not carry with it irreligiousness.
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Atheism involves disbelief in a Creator, but is quite compatible with belief in salvation...
Nor is it incompatible with prayer to the gods,” for they are neither creator nor sustainers
of the universe, and as human beings, bound to the reality of saṃsāra (Smart 23). Thus,
the concepts of theism and atheism, in their definition and understanding in inevitable
reference to the Western or Abrahamic concepts of religion, God, creation, and the
universe, cannot fully apply to Indian systems, for these systems are simply too different.
The tendency to attempt to understand Indian religions through the lens of
Christianity was first established by the early missionaries and the early Orientalists. “To
the Westerner, however, the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West; he also
seeks to convert each aspect of Oriental or Occidental life into an unmediated sign of one
or the other geographical half” (Said 247). Therefore, the many Indian traditions that
came to define Hinduism were interpreted through their comparison with Christianity,
and under the constraints of the model the later had already established. This not only led
to misinterpretations, but also to great generalizations, where single isolated elements
were taken as the representative of the whole.

Elevating Hinduism as a World Religion
The desire to elevate Hinduism as a world religion as a reaction against the negative
depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian Missionaries during the British colonialism of
India further strengthens the homogenizing trend. The British Missionaries’ depiction of
the Hindus as “heathens” with “monstrous and ridiculous” gods, as well as their effort to
convert and thus save them, prompted the Hindus to begin to present their beliefs in
foreign terms, portraying Hinduism as a homogenous religion (Pennington 50).
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Furthermore, the British blamed the source for the inherent immorality of Hinduism,
fueled by stories of violence, human sacrifice, idolatry, and obscenities, on their
polytheism (Pennington 82), and hence established their superiority, as Christians, on
their monotheism. Thus, the negative portrayal of the Hindus by the British Missionaries
prompted their need to respond by presenting their religion in a cohesive and unified
way, with one god and one collection of books, founded upon revelation, and as such,
elevating their religion to the same authority level as the Abrahamic traditions. In time,
the concept of Hinduism as a single system becomes accepted as it is established as a
world religion, particularly after Swami Vivekananda’s address in 1893 at the World’s
Parliament of Religions.
Swami Vivekananda is the foremost contributor to the propagation of Vedānta in
the world. His teachings have had unprecedented effects both in the West and in India.
By “planting the seeds of independent thinking and in creating a pride in India’s past
among the youth” (Rajamani 55), his mission elevated Hindu religion and society, having
a direct impact on the Hindu Renaissance, eventually leading to the independence of
India. He was able to present Hinduism to a Western audience not only in a way that they
could understand, but most significantly, in a way they could come to embrace and
eventually hold as their own.
Vivekananda presented Vedānta as ‘the’ Hindu religion (Vivekananda 1:387); a
universal (Vivekananda 2:375) “religion of non-dual philosophy” (Vivekananda 1:502)
that could be applied to any religion. In the West he preached monotheism (Vivekananda
1:331), barely used Sanskrit terminology, de-emphasized cultural remarks and
furthermore translated concepts into a language adapted for Western Christians: using
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‘God’ or ‘Father’ instead of Brahman. Philip Goldberg sees this as "a conscious decision
to emphasize a universal, adaptable Vedānta-yoga", by not openly disclosing beliefs and
practices that could be perceived "as cultist or idolatrous” (Goldberg 80). In America
Vivekananda never publicly mentioned the extent of his devotion to his guru and his
status as an avatar, nor his guru's devotion to the goddess Kālī. His success in this
endeavor not only opened the doors for other gurus and thinkers, but also created a model
that many have followed in adapting Eastern teachings for a Western culture.

Conclusion
The classification of Patañjali’s Yoga as a Darśana does not come without a series
of implications and consequences. It implies its affiliation into a cohesive and unified
system of thought, its allegiance to the authority of the Vedas, and it defines itself as
distinct from those who are not considered āstika, drawing an alleged clear demarcation
between itself and the nāstikas, when in reality, in many ways, “Yoga holds closer
affinity with Jainism and Buddhism than with its Vedānta and Bhakti cousins” (Chapple,
Yoga and the Luminous ix). Furthermore, its frequent paring with the system of Classical
Sāṃkhya, it allows for īśvara as the main distinction between the two systems, labeling
the former as saiśvara and the later nīrīśvara, which are often translated as theistic and
atheistic, terms that come to misrepresent both systems.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE TERM ĪŚVARA AND ITS PRE-CLASSICAL HISTORY

The categorization of Classical Yoga as a theistic text is directly rooted in the
consequences of the presence of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra. Chapter 2
addresses the consequences that arise from certain prevalent hermeneutical trends that
have led to the theistic interpretation of the term and the concomitant translation of īśvara
as God. Furthermore, it reviews the commentarial tradition of Classical Yoga as well as
the elevation of certain commentaries to be as authoritative, and in some instances, more
authoritative than the original text, further perpetuating such misconceptions. Chapter 3
further expands on the nature of these trends, identifying them as consequences of an
indigenous homogenizing trend that arose as a method to perpetuate Vedic authority and
was perpetuated in order to elevate Hinduism as a world religion.
The third problem mentioned in Chapter 1 is the ambiguity of the term īśvara, for it
has been used throughout history in different contexts and thus conveyed different
meanings. However, the discrepancies in the understanding and application of the term
are not exclusive to its use in different periods of time, but also prevalent in systems that
are contemporary to each other. “Each system sets forth its special doctrine by using,
with necessary modifications, the current language of the highest religious speculation”
(Radhakrishnan and Moore 353). Hence, the different systems have used the most
common philosophical terms, however, they do not necessarily use them with the same
understanding, meaning, or in the same context. In order to demystify the term īśvara,
Chapter 4 is an analysis of its etymology, primarily focusing on its pre-Classical history
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and development. Since in many cases the translation of īśvara as God is almost
automatic, Chapter 4 is an exploration of the meaning of the term, tracing its
development as far back as possible, from its secular origins and its transition from
worldly lord to personal God. Further, it explores the concept of theism in Indian
systems, its connection to the development of the term, and the Abrahamic influence on
the interpretation and thus translation of Hindu terms.
In order to address the issue of terminology, an important distinction needs to be
made between the following categories: (1) Functional deities, such as the Vedic gods
Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, etc., who are individual, particular, and related to a specific aspect
or activity of the universe. (2) Sectarian traditions, such as those focused on the worship
of Viṣṇu or Śiva, which have specific beliefs that are unique to their respective traditions,
and that may vary from one tradition to another. (3) Widespread doctrines, such as the
concepts of karma or mokṣa, which are concepts that have been generally accepted by the
different Hindu traditions, whether they necessarily adhere to them or not. The
development of the term īśvara will be traced from its Vedic origins, addressing the
different stages in the understanding of the term and its use by different texts and systems
of thought, as well as placing the term in the context of these three categories, and how
these relate to theism in the development of Hindu thought.
The current most popular use of the term īśvara in Hindu thought is “in the sense of
‘omnific, omnipresent Supreme God’. Excepting the sectarian words like ‘Śiva’, ‘Viṣṇu’,
‘Rāma’, ‘Kṛṣṇa’, there is probably no other non-sectarian word which is so commonly
used among the Hindus for the idea of God, as the word ‘īśvara’ (or ‘Parameśvara’)”
(Shastri 487). However, the concept of Parameśvara in this sense did not exist until after
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the time of the Buddha (Shastri 498). This is precisely the position of M. D. Shastri, as he
argues that, if the concept of īśvara in the sense of Parameśvara, a supreme and only
creator God, had been established in India at the time of the Buddha, “the rise and great
expansion of a godless system like Buddhism” would have been unattainable (Shastri
502).

Secular Origins of the Term Īśvara
Examples of the secular origin of the term īśvara can be seen in the Aṣṭadhyāyī of
Pāṇini, the most authoritative work on Classical Sanskrit and the Mahābhāṣya of
Patañjali (the grammarian), the great commentary on the former. In both cases the term
“has been consistently used ... in the sense of a rājā or an administrative head” (Shastri
487). Furthermore, in the Mahābhāṣya “the words ‘rājā’, ‘ina’, and ‘īśvara’ are clearly
regarded as synonyms and king Puṣyamitra is spoken of as ‘īśvara’” (Shastri 492), which
clearly demonstrates the secular use of the term. Considering that Pāṇini’s Aṣṭadhyāyī
“has been placed in the 5th century BCE by some and in the 4th century BCE by others”
(Joshi 14), it would make the Aṣṭadhyāyī contemporary to the time of the Buddha, as well
as to at least some Upaniṣads, for the oldest are considered to be dated by Dāsgupta and
Müller between the 6th and 5th century BCE (Joshi 13), and the earliest at around the 2nd
century BCE (Pflueger 4771). The Mahābhāṣya however is considered to be dated
around the 2nd century BCE, therefore, at least until that time, there was no widespread
understanding of īśvara in the sense of Parameśvara.
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Īśvara in the Vedas, Brāhmanas, and Upaniṣads
The term īśvara first begins to be used in the Atharaveda, the youngest of the Vedic
saṃhitas, in five passages; however, it is not used in the sense of Parameśvara, as it is
“used only in the ordinary sense of a lord or master” (Shastri 489). In the Ṛgveda, the
term does not appear at all, and only uses “the epithets īśāna or īśā (from the same root)
to designate the power of such deities as the universal sovereign Varuṇa, guardian of the
cosmic order; Agni, the god of fire; Indra, lightning-hurling leader of the gods; and
Puruṣa, the Cosmic Person” (Pflueger 4751).

The term īśāna, a noun meaning

“possessing, wealthy, reigning” and in its masculine form as ”a ruler” or “master”
(Monier Williams 171) appears “in the Ṛgveda in the sense of ‘a ruler’ and is generally
used for Indra and other gods” (Shastri 488). Furthermore, none of all these functional
deities represent a highest God, since none of them seems to be consistently above the
rest. Additionally, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the Ṛgveda takes a rather agnostic position
regarding the nature of the creator of the universe, and further states the many deities are
not the creators, for they were created after creation took place.
Throughout the Brāhmanas the god Prajāpati is elevated “as the embodiment of
Vedic sacrifice” and begins to be connected to the Absolute Brahman (Pflueger 4751).
However, the suffix pati in Prajāpati is another word that has been used in earlier times
in the sense of a lord which did not become as widespread as the terms derived from īś
(Gonda 133). In the ten older Upaniṣads, the term īśvara “not only has not been used in
the sense of Parameśvara, but also, excepting the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad, it has not
been used at all”, the latter in which it is used in the sense of “capable of” (Shastri 494).
The importance of the concept of Brahman arises in the Upaniṣads; however, it cannot be
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equated to the later understanding of Parameśvara, for the Vedāntic concept of Brahman
does not imply an external worship of an external entity or being, as is the case with the
devotional understanding of Parameśvara. In the Upaniṣads Brahman emerges as the
Absolute; it is the subtle and the concrete, the big and the small, the in and the out, the
Self and the Absolute.
In the Upaniṣads, the ātman, or Self, is seen as the microcosm of Brahman. While
ātman is often times translated as soul, this is not the understanding that the Self is
individual and particular of the person who embodies it. The misunderstanding that arises
in the interpretation of Vedāntic doctrine from later devotional practices has led to the
understanding that the Self searches to merge with Brahman. However, this is not the
case, as the Self is not considered to be separate from Brahman, for Brahman and the Self
are one and the same. The cognitive error in this case is due to the perception that they
are separate, thus, the solution, and hence the goal of the system is the realization that the
separation is an illusion; there is no merging, for they have always been one.
Furthermore, Brahman was never really perceived as a popular deity: “The very fact that
it is conceived in neuter gender shows that it can never be the object of popular worship.
The god of popular worship is always conceived in masculine or feminine gender”
(Shastri 497).
The Kaṭha Upaniṣad describes the eternal qualities of Brahman in terms of the Self,
illustrating their homogeny. Furthermore, it clearly states that Brahman “is neither the
cause nor effect”, for it is the Absolute, which is outside the Western understanding of
God.
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It is – Oṃ. This syllable is Brahman. … The Self, whose symbol is Oṃ, is the
omniscient Lord. He is not born. He does not die. He is neither cause nor effect.
This Ancient One in unborn, imperishable, eternal: though the body be destroyed,
he is not killed (Prabhavanada and Manchester 8).

From Worldly Lord to Parameśvara
The transition of the understanding of īśvara from worldly lord to the sense of
Parameśvara begins with the rise of sectarian traditions as Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism,
“which were occasioned by [the rise of] Buddhism” (Phillips 111). As a reaction to the
Buddhist worship traditions that began after the death of the Buddha, the Brahmin trend
of appropriating doctrines into their tradition in order to maintain their popularity and
authority extended to them giving “prominence to the gods, Viṣṇu and Śiva” and
“clustered around them in Epics and Purāṇas” (Phillips 46). It is only when the term
īśāna begins to be identified as “a synonym of Śiva” that the transition of the term īśvara
towards Parameśvara begins. “In the Śvetāśvatara and other older Śaiva Upaniṣads
‘Maheśvara’ and not ‘īśvara’ has been used for Śiva ... but gradually in the Śaivaite
literature itself ‘īśvara’ came to be used for ‘Maheśvara’”, and later in the tantras the
term īśvara is used as a synonym of Śiva (Shastri 501).
The path of devotion, or bhakti, that arose in sectarian traditions and “percolated
throughout India by the medieval period” (Siegel 422) “continues in the sectarian
literature of the epics and Purāṇas, becoming from the medieval period to modern times
the mainstream of Hindu spirituality” (Pflueger 4752). The devotional and thus exoteric
understanding of īśvara in the sense of Parameśvara could not have become widespread
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until as early as the medieval period. As devotional traditions become increasingly
popular it became necessary, in order to legitimize the devotional approach, to reconcile
them with the most prominent āstika systems, and thus connect them to Vedic authority.
The need for reconciliation gave rise to a syncretic trend that has been perpetuated and
popularized until contemporary times, its most prominent exponent being Vijñānabhikṣu,
who “was active at a time when, on the one hand, in the philosophical field, Vedānta was
at its height and on the other hand, in the religious field, Bhakti was gaining supremacy”
(Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick Philosopher” 8).
In his Yogavārttika Vijñānabhikṣu not only presents īśvara in the sense of
Parameśvara as the efficient cause of the universe (Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A
Maverick Philosopher” 133), but he further considers īśvara to be able to “bring about
quickly asaṃprajñāta-yoga and kaivalya for the devotee who practices bhakti”
(Rukmani, “Vijñānabhikṣu: A Maverick Philosopher” 135), thus irrevocably redefining
kaivalya in terms of its dependency on īśvara, thus elevating the devotional path. This
understanding of īśvara is perpetuated by later commentaries such as Dasgupta’s, as he
not only considers devotion of īśvara to be “the easiest course of attaining samādhi”, but
he states that “by his grace he removes all obstructions” (Dasgupta, Yoga as Philosophy
and Religion 161), making īśvara an active agent in the path of the yogi towards kaivalya
and thus elevating the role of īśvara in the path of Yoga even further. All of these
understandings prove as a series of misplaced assumptions regarding Patañjali’s Yoga
system.
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Theism and Atheism in Indian Thought
The bhakti tradition became increasingly widespread throughout India over time,
and in the process, it intermingled with other prominent traditions, lead the masses to
adopt a devotional approach towards several other sectarian traditions.

This Hindu

devotional approach, however, cannot be necessarily understood as theism in the same
sense as the Abrahamic traditions. The following passage is a description of the syncretic
approach common to Hindu practitioners as well as the incompatibility of Hindu thought
with theism:
My own teacher in India is a devotee of Kṛṣṇa; he also practices Yoga, makes
offerings to Agni, Gaṇeśa, Sarasvatī, and the lot, and without any feeling of
contradiction speaks of saṃsāra as Brahman. He is, I believe, typical of Indian
teachers when he asserts that there is really no difference between Śaṅkara and
Rāmānuja, between Śiva and Viṣṇu, between tantra and bhakti. Is he a theist? I
would not dare ask him for the same reason that I would not dare wonder if Indian
thinking is theistic (Siegel 420).
Theism, as stated previously, implies the belief in an entity who is the creator and
sustainer of the universe, all-powerful, all knowing; “a god who is only one, only
external, only distinct from his creation” (Siegel 420), which is not in line with Indian
understandings of deity or creation. Furthermore, the concept of karma would make a
complete contradiction to the Western concept of God, for in most Indian systems, karma
has more power in affecting people’s destinies than God, for the laws of karma cannot be
broken, even by the most powerful deity (Garbe, “Outlines of a History of Indian
Philosophy” 585). Since in India “God can be one and many, external and internal, even
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real and unreal” (Siegel 420), it is obvious that this understanding of God is completely
different from the concept of God in the Abrahamic religions, therefore, the term theism
would not accurately represent the complexity of the Hindu concept of deity, as it would
be greatly misleading. In this line, the use of the term theism in Hindu thought would thus
define the systems that do not adhere to the same beliefs as atheistic, leading to further
misrepresentation and confusion, for the concept of atheism is vastly different in Hindu
thought from Western thought. “Atheism in the Indian context does not carry with it
irreligiousness. Atheism involves disbelief in a Creator, but is quite compatible with
belief in salvation, ... [and] with prayer to the gods, conceived as beings who are inside,
rather than transcendent to, the empirical cosmos” (Smart 23).

Conclusion
The development of the use of the term īśvara is thus parallel to the development of
the devotional approach in Hindu thought. The concept of creation takes an agnostic
approach in the Vedas, with the appearance of functional and utilitarian deities yet no
definite concept of creator or ultimate single sustainer of the universe. The concept of
Brahman emerges as the Absolute during the Upaniṣads, which in time begins to be tied
with sectarian devotional traditions that spread throughout India during the medieval
period, giving rise to a pseudo-theism that has become a widespread doctrine of Modern
Hinduism.
The term īśvara developed from the terms īśā and īśāna, which share the same
verbal root, used in the earlier Vedas, while īśvara itself was not used until the latest of
the Vedic Saṃhitas. However, none of these terms were used in the sense of

52

Parameśvara, but rather in the sense of a worldly lord, which was a customary address
for the many functional deities. The term was used as well in completely secular
environments and contexts, as is the case with the Aṣṭadhyāyī of Pāṇini and the
Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali in the sense of rājā as an address to kings and worldly lords.
Only when connected to Śaivism, which was a sectarian traditions at that time, does it
begin to be used in the sense of Parameśvara, and only after the popularization of bhakti
leading to the devotional approach to many other systems of thought becoming
widespread does it not begin to be translated as God. This translation is further
perpetuated in the face of Muslim and subsequent British invasions, as an attempt to
legitimize the Hindu religion (Pennington 3).
In spite of the many efforts to elevate Hinduism as a world religion through
attempting to filter and translate it into Abrahamic terms, Hindu traditions can and should
be understood for what they truly are. Hence, this study proposes, in order to avoid
further misunderstandings and confusion, that terms which are irrevocably tied to
Abrahamic traditions not be used as suitable translations for Hindu terms, such as God or
Lord for īśvara. The former has been established throughout the present study as
misleading for several reasons, and the later has contributed to the understanding of
īśvara as God due to its common use in Christian literature and popular parlance to
denote God. Rather, it would lead to increased accuracy to retain the terms in their
original Sanskrit, in the same way this has been done with terms such as Yoga, karma,
and guru, so much so, that they have already become part of common parlance in the
West.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PATH OF CLASSICAL YOGA: READING PATAÑJALI WITHOUT
COMMENTARY

It has been previously stated that the frequent translation of the term īśvara as God
presents several problems: (1) it does not accurately represent the intent of the use and
purpose of the term īśvara as used in the Yogasūtra, specifically obscuring the
interpretation of īśvarapraṇidhāna, a functional aspect of the system. (2) It has directly
led to the common understanding of the main distinction between Sāṃkhya and Yoga as
the former being atheistic while the latter theistic, labels that come to misrepresent both
systems. (3) It allows for the confusion regarding the path of Patañjali, obscuring this
path of discrimination, separation, involution and isolation towards liberation, to a point
where it can lend itself to be interpreted and accommodated to fit into other ideologies,
thus enabling a syncretic trend that has led to the popular understanding of Yoga as
‘union with the divine’. In order to address these issues most accurately, and particularly
due to the ambiguity of the term as well as the inability to decipher with certainty the
intention behind Patañjali’s use of this term, it becomes imperative to understand its
nature and functionality within the constraints of the original text.
Hence, Chapter 5 is the product of a grammatical analysis of the Yogasūtra of
Patañjali

(starting on page 70) without relying on the interpretations presented by

commentary, and the particular translation and interpretation of the text that arises from
it. It focuses on the sūtras that are most relevant in describing the path proposed by
Patañjali, as well as the sūtras that most illustrate the nature and functionality of the term
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īśvara. It is thus both a narrative of the path proposed by Patañjali, strictly based on the
original text, as well as an analysis of the identity, purpose and use of the term īśvara and
the functionality of the concept of īśvarapraṇidhāna within the Yogasūtra, and how these
two relate to his proposed path as a whole, in order to clarify the aforementioned points.

The Ontology of Classical Sāṃkhya
The ontology of Classical Yoga, as that of Classical Sāṃkhya (Sāṃkhyakārikā), is
based on a dualistic model of “subject and object and which maintains that the
fundamental error consists in their confusion or identification in any form or at any level”
(Krishna 202). Sāṃkhya philosophy describes the universe to be made up of only two
independent elements: puruṣa and prakṛti, which “are thus two ultimate, eternal and
independent principles of existence. Puruṣas are many, prakṛti is one” (Tiamni 189).
Patañjali makes very clear that these two elements exist independent from each other, as
well as the fact that there is not one puruṣa or transcendental reality but rather a multitude
of puruṣas or seers, and only one universal reality of nature, or prakṛti. This is illustrated
in sūtra II.22, where he explains that even though the perception or experience of prakṛti
ceases to exist as such for the seer who has accomplished the aim of the path, prakṛti
itself does not, due to its universal nature, and to the multiplicity of puruṣas.
Parkṛti is everything material, even in its most subtle forms, consisting of elements
and sense organs, the latter that include the mind and thought processes, which are for the
sake of puruṣa’s experience and transcendence. Having the character of brightness
(sattva), action (rajas), and inertia (tamas), these are further defined as its primary
constituents, or guṇas (see YSII.1). It is the seen, or dṛśya, which only has the quality of
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being seen, but not the ability to see. Puruṣa is everything that prakṛti is not. In contrast,
it is the seer, or draṣṭṛ, that which only has the ability of seeing, but not the quality of
being seen (see YSII.20). Due to their opposite characteristics they attract each other and
interact, the purpose of that connection (samyoga) being the cultivation of the perception
of the own nature (svarūpa) of the power (śakti) of both puruṣa (the owner) and prakṛti
(the owned) (see YSII.23). Furthermore, the existence of prakṛti (the seen) is strictly for
the purpose of puruṣa (the seer) (see YSII.21), in order for it to become established in its
own nature (svarūpa) (see YSI.3), and thus achieving a state of Yoga (see YSI.2).
In a way, prakṛti, like a body of water, becomes the mirror for puruṣa to see its
reflection upon, which, due to its exclusive nature of seer, is unable to do on its own. In
that process, puruṣa becomes so identified with its reflection, that it loses its identity
completely as it becomes absorbed in its own reflection. This misperception (viparyaya)
is identified by Patañjali as one of the five-fold fluctuations (vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ) of the
mind (see YSI.5), which is the mistaken knowledge (mithyāñjānam) on the foundation of
an appearance that is not what it appears to be (see YSI.8). Hence, the main cognitive
problem arises when, in the process of this interaction, which is supposed to illuminate
the nature of both puruṣa and prakṛti independently, puruṣa’s misidentification with
prakṛti leads to puruṣa to lose the awareness of its own identity. Patañjali describes this
misidentification as avidyā, or ignorance (see YSII.24), and only through its destruction
(abhāva), and thus the dissolution of that connection (saṃyoga) between puruṣa and
prakṛti, can the isolation of seeing (kaivalya) be achieved, which is the goal, ergo the
end, of the path (see YSII.25).
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The Path of Patañjala Yoga
This isolation or abstraction of seeing (kaivalya) is the return to the original state
(pratiprasava) of the primary constituents of nature (guṇas), devoid of purpose for
puruṣa (arthaśūnyānām), as well as the grounding (pratiṣṭhā) of puruṣa in its own nature
(svarūpa) by this cultivated power of awareness (citiśakti) (see YSIV.34). Thus, the
attainment of kaivalya is often times interpreted as liberation; however, while it is very
appropriate to interpret it as such in terms of puruṣa having transcended its cognitive
bond with prakṛti, this does not necessarily imply any type of salvation or release from
saṃsāra, or mokṣa. Patañjali, in fact, ends his fourth and final chapter with this previous
sūtra (YSIV.34), and fails to elucidate further on what happens to the liberated puruṣa
once kaivalya is attained. It appears that Patañjali describes kaivalya exclusively in terms
of prakṛti, as this is the realm where the practice takes place. Once transcended, perhaps
it becomes impossible to describe its puruṣa experience or reality in prakṛtic terms.
The solution Patañjali proposes, is that since a connection between puruṣa and
prakṛti has been established, puruṣa can use its transient prakṛtic vehicle (body and
mind) as a tool to follow a path of involution back towards the abstraction of puruṣa’s
nature, until that connection completely dissolves, and puruṣa can stand in its own nature
(svarūpa) in a state of kaivalya. While Samādhipāda, the first chapter, describes the path
in terms of samādhi, or mental concentration or absorption, Sādhanapāda, the second
chapter, describes it more in terms of practice. Throughout the text, several techniques
are discussed, in order to address the many different practitioners, with their different
temperaments, who are in different stages of the path. At the beginning of the text,
Patañjali defines Yoga as the restriction (nirodha) of the fluctuations of the mind
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(cittavrṛtti) (see YSI.2), further describing the path and some of the techniques in terms
of this definition. Further, he defines the result of the practice of Yoga as the
establishment, or rather remaining (avasthānam), of the seer (drṣṭu) in its own nature (see
YSI.3), and the failure of achievement (itaratra), as the identification with those
fluctuations (see YSI.4).
The first means towards the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind to achieve the
goal of Yoga (YSI.2-3) is practice (abhyāsa) and dispassion (vairagya) (see YSI.12).
From this definition, Patañjali begins to describe the different levels of commitment and
intensity of practice and dispassion, as them being weak (mṛdu), intermediate (madhya),
and intense (adhimātra) (see YSI.22). While he describes dispassion as the conception
(samjñā) of the mastery (vaśīkāra) of being free from desire of that which is seen or
heard (see YSI.15), the highest form of dispassion is the lack of desire for the
constituents of nature (guṇa), or the non-attachment to prakṛti (YSI.16). In the same way,
in order for practice to become grounded (bhūmi), it must be cultivated with reverence
(satkāra), uninterruptedly (nairantarya), and for a long time (dīrgakāla) (see YSI.14).
For those who have this highest level of commitment in their practice leading to its full
establishment, and thus an intense desire of emancipation (tīvrasamvega), the goal of
Yoga is near (see YSI.21). However, for those who do not, there are a series of
alternatives, which are denoted by the word ‘or’ (vā).

Īśvarapraṇidhāna as Concept and Method
The first alternative he mentions is īśvarapraṇidhāna (YSI.23), after which he
dedicated the following six sūtras (YSI.24-29) to elucidate on that technique, defining its

58

nature and its effects. After listing the obstacles (antarāya) (YSI.30-31), he prescribes the
way to transcend them as the practice of a single reality (ekatattva) (see YSI.32),
followed by the other alternative techniques: the retention of breath (YSI.34), the
cognition of a sensory object that creates steadiness of mind (YSI.35), by engaging in
activities that are sorrowless and illuminating (YSI.36), by directing the mind towards
objects in order to transcend attachment (YSI.37), by cultivating knowledge in dreams
and sleep (YSI.38), or, through dhyāna, meditation (YSI.39). The sequence of these
seven alternatives to the intense commitment to practice and dispassion seem to follow a
pattern of internalization, from the most external and concrete, the retention of breath, to
the most internal and abstract, dhyāna. Therefore, at least in this chapter,
īśvarapraṇidhāna appears to function as a starting point towards the process of
internalization, leading to meditation (dhyāna).
However, this is not the only place in the text where īśvarapraṇidhāna is
mentioned. While in Samādhipāda īśvarapraṇidhāna seems to be but on of several
methods or approaches, in Sādhanapāda, the second chapter, it appears as one of the
three elements of Kriyāyoga, which is itself contained in the Niyamas, one of the
elements of Aṣṭaṅga Yoga. Sādhanapāda in fact opens with the introduction of
Kriyāyoga, perhaps establishing its practice as an entry point to the techniques to follow,
and defining it as being composed of three components: tapas, svādhyāya, and
īśvarapraṇidhāna (see YSII.1). Further, it defines the purpose of its practice as leading
towards the cultivation of samādhi and the attenuation of the afflictions or kleśa (YSII.2)
(afflictions defined in YSII.3-10), and states the ultimate method for the eradication of
the fluctuations (vṛttaya) arising from such afflictions to be dhyāna, or meditation (see
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YSII.11). Further along the text, Patañjali introduces the concept of Aṣṭaṅga Yoga, or the
Eightfold Path of Yoga, as being for the cultivation of discernment (vivekakhyāti)
(YSII.28). Kriyāyoga appears here again, contained within the second component of the
path, Niyama, or restraints, along with two more components, purity (śauca) and
contentment (santoṣa) (see YSII.32). Here, he elaborates on the components of
Kriyāyoga: Tapas, or austerity, is the destruction of impurities, the perfection of the body
(kāya) and sense organs (indriya) (see YSII.43), svādhyāya, or self study, is the means
for a connection (samprayoga) 20 to a chosen deity (iṣṭadevatā) (see YSII.44), and
īśvarapraṇidhāna, the means for the perfection (siddhi) of samādhi (see IYSI.45).
Up to this point, īśvarapraṇidhāna has been mentioned in two different chapters: in
the first chapter as perhaps an optional method, and in the second chapter, as more of a
foundational method of this path; however, wherever īśvarapraṇidhāna is mentioned, or
whatever it is connected to, in all cases it leads to samādhi, specifically through dhyāna,
or meditation. The term praṇidhāna can mean ‘attention’, ‘vehement desire’, ‘abstract
contemplation’, ‘fixing’, or ‘vow’. However, in order to reach the most accurate
translation of this word, it is necessary to trace the formation of the word praṇidhāna to
its smallest components: ‘pra + ni + dhā + na’. The verbal root √dhā means ‘placing’,
‘putting’, or, ‘holding’, ‘possessing’, ‘having’. When combined with the suffix ‘na’ it
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Note the difference between Patañjali’s choice of term here for the connection between a yogi and his
iṣṭadevatā, and the term used for the connection between puruṣa and prakṛti. In the former, he uses the
term samprayoga, while in the latter, samyoga. The words are identical except for the prefix ‘pra’ in the
former. This can be understood as a deliberate choice by Patañjali in order to make a distinction between
these two different types of connection. While the yogi requires action and effort (denoted by ‘pra’) in
order to connect to its own concept of deity as part of a method towards concentration and thus
internalization, the puruṣa does not strive to connect with prakṛti, and thus, this connection can be
understood as an unintended misidentification.
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comes to mean ‘containing’, ‘holding’, ‘receptacle’, or ‘case’. So far, it can mean either
‘placing’ or ‘holding’ something somewhere, however, there is still the contribution of
the prefixes ‘pra’ and ‘ni’ in this construction to consider. The prefix ‘pra’ as an adverb
means ‘forward’, or ‘forth’, and as an adjective, ‘like’, or ‘resembling’. First of all,
whether in use as an adverb or adjective, ‘pra’ denotes an action, something that is
performed. Adding the adverb ‘ni’, which can mean ‘in’, ‘into’, or ‘within’, adds yet
another dimension to its meaning. Thus, when combined with the term īśvara,
praṇidhāna can be interpreted as the action of placing or holding forth into īśvara, or
resembling what is contained or that which resides within īśvara, the essence of īśvara.

The Identity and Use of Īśvara in the Yogasūtra
After the introduction of īśvarapraṇidhāna, Patañjali describes īśvara as a special
or distinct (viśeṣa) puruṣa, its distinction resting on the fact that he is untouched by the
accumulations of karma that arise from afflictions (kleśa) (see YSI.24), and in which the
omniscient (sarvajña) seed (bīja) is unsurpassed (niratiśaya) (see YSI.25), as he is the
teacher (guru) of the ancestors (pūrveṣam) from not being limited (ānāvacchedāt) by
time (kāla) (see YSI.26). The fact that īśvara is deemed a puruṣa means he is not outside
the Sāṃkhya-Yoga model of duality, therefore, as a puruṣa, he is by definition a seer, a
witness of the seen, or prakṛti, and hence unable to interact with prakṛti in a way in
which he could have any effect or influence upon it. From Patañjali’s definition, īśvara
appears to be a representative of the highest ideal of the path, rather than an external
deity, and certainly, much different from a creator or sustainer God. Thus, by having
included a definition of īśvara that contradicts the popular theistic meaning of the term,

61

presents a possible deliberate intention of Patañjali to separate his use of the term from its
use by other systems of thought or traditions (see Chapter 4 for the pre-classical history
of the term īśvara).
Upon defining the identity of īśvara, Patañjali proceeds to explain the method of
īśvarapraṇidhāna, as the recitation (japa) of the praṇava (oṃ), īśvara’s sound (see
YSI.27), which leads to the nature (artha) of essence or meditation (bhāvanā) (see
YSI.28). This chanting or repetition (japa) of the praṇava (oṃ) serves a dual purpose. On
the one hand, it is an abstract or vibrational representation of an ideal reality (īśvara), and
on the other, it is a tool in this process of internalization, standing as a link, through
action (chanting), between the conceptual īśvara and the fully internalized experience of
transcendence. By being used as a point of focus, going beyond the identity of īśvara in
worldly terms, using the praṇava as an abstract representation of the archetype of the
ultimate reality, through a process of internalization, from the japa or repetition, which
represents a gross element or reality, to bhāvanā or essence/meditation, which represents
a subtle or abstract element or reality, thus emerging as a deep empirical experience in
the realm of meditation. As a result, the recitation of oṃ allows the yogi to have an
experience beyond body and mind, beyond prakṛti: an experience of puruṣa itself.
Meditating on īśvara, who is a puruṣa that has never lost its identity to prakṛti, the
pragmatic approach of Yoga allows the puruṣa to use īśvara as an alternate mirror, so to
speak, in the process of bringing awareness back to an internal and subtle place, and
eventually back to its true nature (svarūpa).
As far as Kriyāyoga, if Niyama is understood as a restraint, the question arises,
what is it restraining? Patañjali defines the path of Aṣṭaṅgayoga to be for the purpose of
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the cultivation of discernment, or vivekakhyāti, of the own identity of puruṣa from its
misidentification with prakṛti (YSII.28). The Niyama elements additional to Kriyāyoga,
śauca and santoṣa, establish a desire to protect one’s body (svāṅgajugupsā) (YSII.40), a
mastery (jaya) of the sense organs, one-pointedness (aikāgrya) and right understanding
(saumanasya) (YSII.41), as well as unsurpassed (anuttama) happiness (sukha) (YSII.42).
These are further combined with the results from the practice of Kriyāyoga: the
destruction of impurities and the perfection of the body and sense organs through tapas
(see YSII.43), the connection to a chosen deity (iṣṭadevatā) through svādhyāya (see
YSII.44), and the practice of īśvarapraṇidhāna as the means for the perfection of
samādhi (see YSII.45). Clearly, the nature of these methods restrain the mind from
engaging in further misidentifications, and hence in activities that lead away from the
achievement of discernment (vivekakhyāti), as they support a self-centered, inwardminded approach. Even in the case of the use of iṣṭadevatā through svādhyāya, since this
is followed by īśvarapraṇidhāna, it can be understood as an external point of focus in
order to achieve one-pointedness (aikāgrya), and to be fully internalized through the
practice of īśvarapraṇidhāna in order to cultivate right understanding (saumanasya).
Through the practice of īśvarapraṇidhāna, the yogi attempts to establish a
connection with īśvara, yet īśvara here is not an external element or deity to worship, but
rather a direct experience of puruṣa, where the yogi is able to get a direct glimpse of its
true nature. In contrast, the concept of iṣṭadevatā, presented by Patañjali as an element of
svādhyāya, or self study, would function as an external deity, yet still, not one to worship
particularly, but rather one to establish a connection or identification with (samprayoga)
for the purpose of self study (see YSII.44). In this context, it seems the role of īśvara is
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described as a tool in the process of internalization necessary to fulfill this goal. If truth is
to be defined as the closest approximation to a particular ultimate reality, in this sense,
īśvara is proposed to be an archetype of this ultimate or rather ideal reality, which
attainment is the goal of Yoga. The attainment of this reality does not imply going
anywhere or merging with anything external, but rather realizing one’s own nature. Thus,
praṇidhāna becomes more of a concept that aids in a process of internalization, or a
transference of identity of the essence of īśvara with that of the yogi, which are the same
in nature, puruṣa, rather than a seeking to attempt an external union or devotion.

Classical Yoga vs. Vedānta
From the present analysis, it thus becomes evident that the many common syncretic
trends between Classical Yoga with other systems of thought, particularly those that lead
to the popular understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the divine’, are nothing more than a
misplaced reconciliation attempt, based on assumptions and interpretations that are in
fundamental contradiction with the original text. The path Vedānta proposes is
immensely different from that of Patañjali, as the nature of the cognitive error, as well as
the solution, are completely opposing concepts. In contrast with Classical Yoga and
Sāṃkhya, in the Upaniṣads there is only one element in the universe: Brahman;
“incomprehensible, for it cannot be comprehended; un-decaying, for it never decays;
unattached, for it never attaches itself; unfettered, for it is never bound” (Prabhavanada
and Manchester 127). It is the subtle and the concrete, the big and the small, the in and
the out, the Self and the Absolute. The ātman, or Self, is seen as the microcosm of
Brahman and not as a separate entity; therefore, Brahman and ātman are precisely one
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and the same. As in Classical Yoga, the error is due to avidyā, however, in Vedānta, the
nature of this error is not due to a coming together, but rather a coming apart, when the
ātman forgets its Brahmanic nature, as the fact that it and Brahman are one and the same.
If Vedānta were to be translated into Sāṃkhyan terms, it could be said that there is
only puruṣa, which is only one, and the illusion lies in perceiving prakṛti as real as well
as the separation between the many puruṣas as real. Realization then comes in realizing
this illusion and uniting the seemingly separate and individual puruṣa with the one
puruṣa that is eternally divine (Brahman). Since Sāṃkhya presents a dualistic model and
Vedānta a non-dualistic model, the solution for the error in both systems is fundamentally
different, thus their approaches towards liberation, completely opposite. ‘Yoga’, as a
vehicle of correcting this primordial error, etymologically derives from the Sanskrit verb
root ‘yuj’, meaning to yoke, can be defined as either joining or harnessing. In this light,
while the term joining applies to Vedānta, the term harnessing would definitely be much
more appropriate for Patañjali’s Yoga. Therefore, “the fact that some interpreters have
tried to read into them [Sāṃkhyakārikā and Yogasūtra] both theism and Vedāntism... [is]
a violation of the spirit of Sāṃkhya as a distinctive philosophical position” (Krishna 198).
Īśvarapraṇidhāna as an external concept can be seen as a vehicle towards a process
of abstraction that leads to the deep internalization of an experience of an ideal reality. If
one mistakenly perceives the path as the goal, getting stuck on the vehicle rather than
pursuing the destination, the destination will never be reached. Thus, the conception of
connection with or worship of īśvara as the goal of Yoga would create a situation in
which the path is mistaken for the goal, staying in the realm of devotion and eternally
waiting to receive mokṣa from īśvara, getting lost in the misidentification of the self with
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the path, creating attachment, and hence completely loosing the experiential nature of this
path. Much like learning how to drive a car, once one achieves some basic competency in
the activity, attachment is formed to the feeling of driving, and thus one begins to drive
aimlessly for the sake of driving. Since for a beginner the goal of learning how to drive
seems to be simply the ability to perform the act of driving, the more advanced driver
should understand that learning how to drive is only a means to reach a destination. This
logic would leave the one who did not, or perhaps could not go past the beginner stage,
driving around in circles.

The Concept of God in Patañjala Yoga
In order to accommodate the concept of God into a strictly dualistic model such as
that of Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga, God would have to be either puruṣa or prakṛti, as
he cannot be both, and he cannot be neither, appearing as a distinct entity or reality, since
there are no realities that exist outside or above puruṣa and prakṛti. Even if it was said
that there is a reality that exists above these two, such as is the position of some theistic
commentators, “in either case the God is irrelevant from the perspective of salvation of
the individual puruṣa” (Larson 237). Having established that īśvara, existing within the
constraints of Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s dualistic cosmology, is a puruṣa who has never been
bound by prakṛti, and that the path Patañjali proposes follows a path of involution
towards isolation, it becomes evident not only that īśvara is not God, but that the
existence or not existence of a theistic God is irrelevant in the path of Classical Yoga.
According to G. M. Coleman, “Patañjali Yoga technique prescinds from whether
someone admits a God or denies him” (qtd. in Feurstein, The philosophy of Classical
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Yoga 13). Larson considers the concept of a creator God to be irrelevant in the ontology
of both Classical Yoga and Classical Sāṃkhya, and relates this to Sartre’s position of
theism regarding existentialism: “Existentialism is not an atheism in the sense that it
would wear itself out in trying to demonstrate that God does not exist. It declares rather:
even if God existed, that would change nothing” (qtd. in Larson 237). Whether īśvara is
perceived by some as an “inactive deity” (Deussen qtd. in Burley 39), the Supreme
Creator Brahman (Vijñānabhikṣu), or an experiential reality, since it is not a creator, nor
sustainer, and has in fact, by definition, no means to function within prakṛti, and thus has
no role in the liberation of puruṣas, the existence or non-existence of a theistic God is
utterly irrelevant in Classical Yoga.

Sāṃkhya as Atheistic and Yoga as Theistic
Another problem of the translation of the term īśvara as God in Patañjali’s
Yogasūtra is the common understanding of the main distinction between Classical
Sāṃkhya and Classical Yoga as the former being atheistic while the latter theistic, labels
that come to misrepresent both systems. The only determinant leading to this labeling
appears to be the either presence or absence of the term īśvara, as while the term does not
appear in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, it does in the Yogasūtra. Hence, in terms of the presence or
absence of the term īśvara in the two different texts, Yoga has been labeled as saiśvara
(with īśvara) and Sāṃkhya as nirīśvara (without īśvara). Having established that
Classical Yoga, following the same ontology as that of Sāṃkhya, adheres to a strict
dualistic model that could not possibly accommodate a theistic concept of God, their
saiśvara and nirīśvara classifications should not reflect their respective adherence to or
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rejection of a believe in God. While there is a difference between the two texts the
systems which they represent, the nature of their distinction in terms of theism appears to
be rooted in the mistranslation and misinterpretation of the term īśvara as God.

Conclusion
From the present analysis, the term īśvara and its functionality within the
Yogasūtra, particularly pertaining to the concept of īśvarapraṇidhāna, emerges as the
representation of an empirical concept and a functional component of the path of Yoga,
rather than an ontological concept. Its functionality is defined by the experiential nature
of the system itself, for it does not seek to present a philosophical point of view but rather
presents a series of techniques to be used in order to achieve a series of experiences
leading towards the ultimate goal of yoga, kaivalya or isolation in one’s own nature. The
role of īśvara is therefore akin to the instruction manual Patañjali presents: a series of
practical tools that facilitate a series of internalizing experiences aimed at the attainment
of an ultimate goal. Thus, much rather than being or representing God, and thus being the
determinant for the system of Classical Yoga to be classified as theistic, īśvara represents
the ultimate ideal of the goal of Yoga: a puruṣa that has never lost its identity to its
misidentification with prakṛti, and as such, it functions as a practical and experiential
tool, by being an archetype of this ultimate reality, designed to aid the yogi in its path
towards liberation.
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Grammatical Analysis

Key
m

masculine

n

neuter

f

feminine

p

pronoun

adj. adjective
adv. adverb
ind. indeclinable
sing. singular
dl.

dual

pl.

plural

Nominal Cases
1

subject

2

direct object

3

‘by/with’

4

‘to/for’

5

‘from’

6

‘of/’s’

7

‘in/on/at’
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I SAMĀDHIPĀDA
I.1 atha yogānuśāsanam
now the instruction of yoga
atha

‘now‘

ind.

yoga
anuśāsanam

m(a)1sing.
‘instruction‘

n(a)1sing.

I.2 yogaścittavṛttinorodhaḥ
yoga is cessation of the fluctuations of the mind
yoga

m(a)1sing.

citta-

‘mind, thought’

vṛtti-

‘turning, moving, existing’

cittavṛtti-

‘continuous course of thoughts’

norodhaḥ

‘process of ending‘

m(a)1sing.

I.3 tadādraṣṭu svarupe’vasthānam
then the seer remains in its own nature
tadā

‘then‘

ind.

draṣṭu

‘of the seer‘

m(ṛ)6sing.

(draṣṭṛ)

‘looker, one who sees’

sva-

‘own’

rūpe-

‘in nature‘

m(a)7sing.

avasthānam

‘remaining‘

n(a)1sing.
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I.4 vṛtti sārūpyamitaratra
elsewhere it remains identified with [those] fluctuations
vṛttisārūpya

‘similarity, sameness in form’

n(a)1sing.

itaratra

‘elsewhere‘

ind.

I.5 vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣtālkiṣṭāḥ
fluctuations are five-fold; obstructing and non-obstructing
vṛttayaḥ

plural of vṛtti

f(i)1pl.

pañcatayyaḥ-

‘five-fold‘

f(ī)1pl.

kliṣṭa-

‘obstructing’

akliṣṭāḥ

‘non-obstructing‘

f(a)1pl.

I.6 pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ
[fluctuations are] evaluation, misperception, conceptualization, sleep, memory
pramāṇa-

‘evaluation’

viparyaya-

‘misperception’

vikalpa-

‘conceptualization’

nidrā-

‘sleep’

smṛtayaḥ

‘memory‘

f(i)1pl.

I.7 pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni
evaluation is direct perception, inference, testimony
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pratyakṣa-

‘direct perception’

anumāna-

‘inference’

agamāḥ

‘testimony‘

m(a)1pl.

pramāṇāni

‘evaluation

n(a)1pl.

I.8 viparyayo mithyāñjānamatadrupapratiṣṭham
misperception is mistaken knowledge, the foundation of not that form
viparyayaḥ

‘misperception‘

m(a)1sing.

mithyā-

‘mistaken, false‘

jñānam

‘knowledge‘

n(a)1sing.

a-tad-

‘not that‘

ind.

rūpa-

‘appearance, form’

pratiṣṭham

‘foundation‘

n(a)1sing.

I.12 abhyāsa vairagyābhyām tannirodhaḥ
that cessation, is both practice and dispassion
abhyāsa-

‘practice, vigilance of awareness’

vairagya

‘by non attachment, dispassion’

n(a)3dual

tad-

‘that‘

ind.

nirodhaḥ

‘cessation‘

m(a)1sing.

I.13 tatrasthitau yatno’bhyāsaḥ
staying there [in its own nature] is the purpose of practice
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tatra-

‘there‘

ind.

sthiti

‘staying in a particular condition’ f(i)7sing.

yatna-

‘attempt, effort‘

abhyāsa

‘practice‘

m(a)1sing.

I.14 satu dīrgakālanairantaryasatkārāsevito dṛḍhabhūmiḥ
moreover, that [practice] has firm ground when cultivated with reverence,
uninterruptedly, for a long time
saḥ-

‘that‘

m(p)1sing.

tu-

‘moreover‘

ind.

dīrga-

‘long’

kāla-

‘time’

nairantarya-

‘uninterruptedness’

satkāra-

‘reverence, consideration, attention’

āsevita

‘practiced assiduously’

dṛḍha-

‘firm, fixed, steady’

bhūmi

‘position, ground‘

m(a)1sing.

m(i)1sing.

I.15 dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayavitṛṣṇasya vaśīkārasaṃjñāvairāgyam
dispassion is the conception of the mastery of being free from desire of that which
is seen or heard
dṛṣṭa-

‘visible, seen’

ānuśravika-

‘according to hearing’
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viṣaya-

‘subject matter’

vitṛṣṇasya

‘(of) free from desire‘

vaśīkāra-

‘subjugating, mastery’

saṃjñā

‘conception, clear knowledge’

f(ā)1sing.

vairāgya

‘non-attachment, dispassion’

n(a)1sing.

m(a)6sing.

I.16 tat paraṃ puruṣakhyāter guṇavaiṭṛṣṇyam
that supreme [vairāgya] is the lack of desire for the constituents of nature, from the
identification with puruṣa
tad-

‘that‘

ind.

para

‘supreme‘

n(a)1sing.

puruṣakhyāti

‘(from) name, title, identification’ f(i)5sing.

guṇa-

‘primary constituents of nature’

vaiṭṛṣṇyam

‘free from desire‘

n(a)1sing.

I.21 tīvrasaṃvegānāmāsannaḥ
of [those with an] intense desire of emancipation, [nirodhaḥ] is near
tīvra-

‘acute, intense‘

adj.

saṃvega

‘desire of emancipation’

m(a)6pl.

āsannaḥ

‘proximity, nearness‘

m(a)1sing.
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I.22 mṛdumadhyādhimātratvāttato’pi viśeṣaḥ
there is also a distinction from weakness, mediumness, intenseness
mṛdu-

‘mild, weak’

madhya-

‘center, middle’

adhimātratva

‘(from) excessive (ness)‘

n(a)5sing.

tataḥ-

‘from there‘

ind.

api-

‘also‘

ind.

viśeṣaḥ

‘difference, distinction’

m(a)1sing.

I.23 īśvarapraṇidhānadvā
or from īśvarapraṇidhāna
īśvara√īśa

‘to rule over’

-vara

‘best, preferable’

adj.

‘(from) meditation/transference’

m(a)5sing.

‘forward, forth’

adv.

‘like, resembling’

adj.

ni

‘in, into, with’

adv.

√dhā

‘to hold, to maintain, to give’

praṇidhānāt
pra

vā

‘ideal, ruler, lord, master, supreme soul’

‘or‘

ind.
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I.24 kleśakarmavipākāśayairaparāmṛṣtaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ
īśvara is a special/distinct puruṣa untouched by the accumulations of karma that
arise from afflictions
kleśa-

‘affliction’

karmavipāka-

‘effect, result, ripening’

āśaya

‘(by/with) receptacle, abode’

m(a)3pl.

aparāmṛṣṭa

‘untouched‘

m(a)1sing.

‘distinction, special (adj.)’

m(a)1sing.

puruṣaviśeṣa
īśvaraḥ

m(a)1sing.

I.25 tatra niratiśayam sarvajñabījam
there the omniscient seed is unsurpassed
tatra

‘in that case, there, therefore’

ind.

niratiśaya

‘unsurpassed, perfect‘

adj.

sarvajña

‘all-knowing, omniscient’

bīja

‘seed‘

n(a)1sing.

I.26 pūrveṣamapi guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt
also, [he is] the teacher of the ancestors from not being limited by time
pūrveṣam

‘of the ancestors‘

m(a)pron.6sing.

pūrva + eṣām

‘of‘

pron.
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api-

‘even, also‘

ind.

guruḥ

‘teacher‘

m(u)1sing.

kāla

‘(by/with) time‘

m(a)3sing.

ānānavacchedāt

m(a)5sing.

an ‘non’ + avaccheda ‘limitation‘ (from)

I.27 tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ
his sound is oṃ
tasya-

‘his‘

ind.

vācaka

‘word, significant sound’

m(a)1sing.

praṇava

‘syllable oṃ‘

m(a)1sing.

I.28 tajjapastadarthabhāvanam
this recitation leads to the essence/meditation of essence/meditation
tad

‘that, this‘

japa

‘repetition of a recitation’

m(a)1sing.

tad

‘that, this‘

m(a)1sing.

artha

‘meaning, purpose, aim’

n(a)1sing.

bhāvanā

‘essence, nature, meditation’

n(a)1sing.

I.29 tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigamo’pyantarāyābhāvaśca
from there, the attainment of the involution of consciousness and also the
disappearance of obstacles
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tataḥ-

‘from there‘

ind.

pratyak-

‘backwards, in the opposite direction’

cetanā-

‘consciousness, sense, understanding’

adhigama

‘mastery, act of attaining’

m(a)1sing.

api-

‘also, even‘

ind.

antarāya-

‘impediment, obstacle’

abhāva

‘absence, annihilation’

m(a)1sing.

ca

‘and‘

ind.

I.32 tat pratiṣedrārthameka tattvābhyāsaḥ
the practice of a single reality is for the sake of preventing that [obstacle]
tad-

‘that, this‘

m(a)1sing.

pratiṣedha-

‘prevention, warding off’

-artham

‘for the sake of‘

eka-

‘one’

tattva-

‘true/real state, element, reality’

abhyāsa

‘practice‘

ind.

m(a)1sing.
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II SĀDHANAPĀDA
II.1 tapaḥ svādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni kriyāyogaḥ
the tree components of kriyāyoga are tapas, svādhyāya, īśvarapraṇidhāna
tapas

‘heat, austerity, deep concentration’

svādhyāya

‘self study, reciting to one’s self’

īśvarapraṇidhānāni
kriya

n(a)1pl.

‘action, purification, means’

yogaḥ

m(a)1sing.

II.2 samādhibhāvanārthaḥ kleśatanūkaraṇārthaśca
the purpose/meaning is the cultivation of samādhi and the attenuation of the
afflictions
samādhibhāvanā-

‘essence, nature, meditation’

artha

‘meaning, purpose, aim’

kleśa-

‘affliction’

tanū-

‘thin, diminish’

tanūkaraṇa-

‘attenuation, dilution‘

karaṇa-

‘making, effecting’

artha

‘meaning, purpose, aim’

n(a)1sing.

ca

‘and‘

ind.
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n(a)1sing.

n(a)1sing.

II.11 dhyānaheyāstadvṛttayaḥ
those fluctuations [arising from afflictions (II.3-10)] are abandoned by meditation
dhyāna

‘meditation’

heyāḥ

‘to be abandoned, gone’

f(ā)1pl.

tad-

‘that‘

ind.

vṛttayaḥ

fluctuations

f(i)1pl.

II.18 prakāśakriyāsthitiśīlaṃ bhūtendriyātmakaṃ bhogāpavargārthaṃ dṛśyam
the seeable/seen has the character of brightness (sattva), action (rajas), and inertia
(tamas). it consists of elements and sense organs. [they are] for the sake of
experience and transcendence.
prakāśa-

‘brightness‘

kriyā-

‘action, purification, means’

sthiti-

‘inertia’

śīlam

‘character, tendency‘

bhūta-

‘elements’

indriya-

‘sense organs’

-ātmakam

‘consisting of‘

bhoga-

‘experience’

apavarga-

‘absolution, fulfillment’

artham-

‘for the sake of‘

ind.

dṛśyam

‘visible object/world‘

n(a)1sing.

n(a)1sing.

n(a)1sing. suffix
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II.20 draṣṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ
the seer [has the quality of] seeing only, although pure, perceiving intellect
draṣṭā

‘seer‘

m(ṛ)1sing.

(draṣṭṛ)

‘looker, one who sees’

dṛśi-

‘seeing’

mātraḥ

‘only‘

m(a)1sing.

śuddhaḥ-

‘pure, absolute, simple’

m(a)1sing.

api

‘though’

ind.

pratyaya

‘conception, idea, intellect’

anupaśyaḥ

‘seeing, perceiving‘

m(a)1sing.

II.21 tadartha eva dṛśyasyātmā
the existence of the seeable/seen is indeed for the purpose of that [seer]
tad-

‘that‘

ind.

arthaḥ

‘meaning, purpose, aim’

n(a)1sing.

eva

‘only, truly, indeed‘

ind.

dṛśyasya-

‘(of) seeable, seen’

n(a)6sing.

ātmā

‘soul, principle of life, existence’ m(an)1sing.

II.22 kṛtārthaṃ prati naṣṭamapyanaṣṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt
with respect to what purpose is accomplished, that [the seen] has vanished, although
that [the seen] has not vanished due to its universality
kṛta-

‘obtained, accomplished’
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adj.

artha

‘meaning, purpose, aim’

n(a)1sing.

prati-

‘with respect to’

naṣṭam-

‘vanished, disappeared’

adj.

api-

‘though‘

ind.

anaṣṭam-

‘not vanished, not disappeared’

adj.

tat-

‘that‘

p

anya-

‘other‘

adj.

sādhāraṇatvāt

‘(from) universality‘

n(a)5sing.

II.23 svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ
that connection is the cause of the perception of the own nature of the power of both
the owner [puruṣa] and the owned [prakṛti]
sva

‘property, wealth’

svāmi

‘owner, master’

śaktyoḥ

‘(of the two/both) śakti’

(śakti)

‘energy, power’

svarūpa

‘own nature’

upalabdhi

‘perception, understanding’

hetuḥ

‘cause, reason’

saṃyoga

‘union, combination, connection’ m(a)1sing.

f(i)6dl.

m(u)1sing.
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II.25 tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvohānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyam
from that destruction [of avidyā (II.24 avidyā is the cause of saṃyoga)] comes the
destruction of the connection [between puruṣa and prakṛti (II.23)]. that [resulting]
cessation [at the end of the path] is isolation of seeing (kaivalya).
tad-

‘that’

ind.

abhāvāt

‘(from) annihilation’

m(a)5sing.

saṃyoga-

‘union, combination, connection’

abhāvaḥ

‘annihilation’

m(a)1sing.

hānaṃ

‘cessation, non-existence’

n(a)1sing.

tad-

‘that’

ind.

dṛśeḥ

‘(of) seeing‘

m(i)6sing.

kaivalyam

‘isolation, abstraction‘

n(a)1sing.

II.32 śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ
the niyamas are: śauca, santoṣa, tapas, svādhyāya, īśvarapraṇidhāna
śauca-

‘purity’

santoṣa-

‘contentment, satisfaction’

tapas-

‘heat, austerity, deep concentration’

svādhyāya-

‘self study, reciting to one’s self’

īśvarapraṇidhānāni
niyamāḥ

n(a)1pl.
‘rules, restriction, restraint’
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m(a)1pl.

II.43 kāyendriyasiddhiraśuddhikṣayāt tapasaḥ
tapas is the destruction of impurities, the perfection of the body and sense organs
kāya

‘body‘

m(a)1sing.

indriya-

‘sense organs’

siddhiḥ

‘perfection, attainment‘

f(i)1sing.

aśuddhi

‘impurity‘

f(i)1sing.

kṣayāt

‘(from) destruction, removal’

n(a)5sing.

tapasaḥ

‘austerity, asceticism, heat’

m(a)1pl.

II.44 svādhyāyādiṣṭahevatāsamprayogaḥ
a connection to a chosen deity is from svādhyāya
svādhyāyāt

‘(from) self study/recitation’

m(a)5sing.

iṣṭa-

‘beloved, cherished, respected’

devatā-

‘deity, image of a deity’

samprayogaḥ

‘union, conjunction, connection’ m(a)1sing.

II.45 samādhisiddhirīśvarapraṇidhānāt
the perfection of samādhi is from īśvarapraṇidhāna
samādhisiddhiḥ-

‘perfection, attainment’

īśvarapraṇidhānāt

f(i)1sing.
n(a)5sing.
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IV KAIVALYAPĀDA
IV.34 puruṣarthaśūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā
citiśaktyoreriti
thus, isolation/abstraction (kaivalya) is the return to the original state of the primary
constituents of nature, empty of purpose for puruṣa, or the grounding in its own
nature by the power of awareness/understanding.
puruṣaartha

‘meaning, purpose, aim’

n(a)1sing.

śūnyānāṃ

‘(of) empty, blank‘

m(a)6sing.

guṇānam

‘(of) primary constituents’

m(a)6sing.

pratiprasavaḥ

‘return to the original state’

m(a)1sing.

kaivalyam

‘isolation, abstraction‘

n(a)1sing.

svarūpa-

‘own condition, nature‘

pratiṣṭhā

‘ground, foundation, stability’

f(ā)1sing.

vā

‘or‘

ind.

citi-

‘understanding, awareness’

śakti-

‘(by/with) energy, power’

f(i)3sing.

iti

‘thus*‘

ind.

*in this context, to indicate the end of the text.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The mere presence of the term īśvara in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra has come to affect
the meaning of both the path and the goal of Classical Yoga as well as the meaning of the
term Yoga itself. The ambiguity of the term īśvara has greatly contributed to its
susceptibility to theistic interpretation and concomitant translation as God, for it leads to
the obscuring of this path of discrimination, separation, involution and isolation towards
liberation, to a point where it can lend itself to be interpreted and accommodated to fit
into other ideologies, thus enabling a syncretic trend that has led to the popular
understanding of Yoga as ‘union with the divine’. In turn, this has become the primary
determinant to label the system of Classical Yoga as theistic. The purpose of the present
study is to shed some light on the subject, not only by analyzing the term within the
constraints of the Yogasūtra, but also by identifying the several trends throughout the
development of Hinduism that have contributed to the most prominent hermeneutical
trends that have led to the obscurity of this subject.
The conflicting variety of not only different translations and interpretations but
different approaches to defining the term īśvara as well as its placement and function
within the Yoga system have directly contributed to the many misconceptions on the
subject, since, without much further and deeper investigation, and a full understanding of
the system as a whole, it can lend itself to people picking and choosing whatever views
are in agreement with their own. The rich philosophical history of India has propounded a
myriad of approaches and traditions, however, after the establishment of Classical
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Hinduism through the categorization of the six Darśanas, subsequent works were
irrevocably “reconciled with the doctrines of the other of the existing systems, and put
down as faithful interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries”. Amidst a
defensive environment in which the different systems constantly tried to elevate their
own school and lineage over the others, tradition inhibited the development and
succession of independent thinkers and interpretation (Dasgupta, A History of Indian
Philosophy 64). Their work depended on previous commentaries, and for one reason or
another they were unable to look past the shadows casted upon the works they were
commenting on to be able to provide a fresh perspective rather than perpetuate the
misinterpretations of their predecessors who were biased by their intent to elevate their
own belief systems and allegiances.
The catalyst for the syncretic trend that plays an essential role in the
misrepresentation of Patañjali’s path of Yoga is a homogenizing trend that primarily
arises from a necessity to perpetuate Vedic authority that starts as a reaction against the
rise of the Upaniṣadic movement. Further, this homogenizing trend is then continued by
the need to categorize Hinduism into a cohesive system with agreeable components,
arising from the necessity to organize against the rise of traditions, such as Jainism, but
particularly Buddhism, that vehemently denied the authority of the Vedas. This gave birth
to the ambiguous categorization of the āstikas and the nāstikas, the agreers and the
deniers, which are directly tied to the emergence of the six Darśanas, or ‘orthodox’
systems of thought, as the philosophies that constitute Classical Hinduism. This
homogenizing trend is further strengthened by the desire to elevate Hinduism as a world
religion as a reaction against the negative depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian
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missionaries during the British colonialism of India, which, further strengthens Vedic
authority and ultimately legitimizes Hinduism as a world religion, finally emerging not
only as a homogenous system but further presented, in many instances, as a monotheistic
religion, and thus, elevated to the authority of the Abrahamic religions.
The classification of Patañjali’s Yoga as a Darśana implies its affiliation into a
cohesive and unified system of thought, ensuring a false sense of continuity and
coherence within the development of ‘Hinduism’, advocating an absolutism that has
reduced a plethora of different practices, philosophies and world-views to a single
religion. Furthermore, it presents a questionable allegiance to the authority of the Vedas,
and it defines itself as distinct from those who are not considered āstika, drawing an
alleged clear demarcation between itself and the nāstikas, when in reality, in many ways,
“Yoga holds closer affinity with Jainism and Buddhism than with its Vedānta and Bhakti
cousins” (Chapple, Yoga and the Luminous ix). Furthermore, its frequent paring with the
system of Classical Sāṃkhya, it allows for īśvara as the main distinction between the two
systems, labeling the former as saiśvara and the later nīrīśvara, which are often
translated as theistic and atheistic, terms that come to misrepresent both systems.
The syncretic trend that has led to the many discrepancies and misunderstandings
obscuring the path of Classical Yoga are the product of an indigenous homogenizing
trend stemming from the perpetuation of Vedic authority that starts as a reaction against
the rise of the Upaniṣadic movement. This is continued by the need to organize Hinduism
into a cohesive system of agreeable components standing strong against the rise of
Buddhism, giving birth to the categorization of āstikas and nāstikas, the emergence of the
six Darśanas, and ultimately, Classical Hinduism. As a reaction against the negative
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depiction of Hindu traditions by Christian Missionaries during the British colonialism of
India, the homogenizing trend is further strengthened as a necessity to elevate Hinduism
as a world religion. Further, the syncretic trend is not confined to Indian traditions. In
order to legitimize Hinduism as a world religion in a Christian dominated West, in many
cases, Hindu traditions have been presented after a process of filtering through foreign
terms and concepts, which have come to reduce a myriad of rich heterogeneous traditions
to an easily translatable and adaptable ‘way of life’ that can be ‘attached’ to other
religions and practices. This leads to the complex system of Yoga to come to be so
divorced from its roots to such an extent that it can easily be reduced to a mere series of
calisthenics.
The consideration of the popular understanding of the term Yoga as union prompts
the necessity for clarification in order to determine what is being joined with what. In this
understanding, the concept of union with the divine would imply, assuming the common
theistic interpretation of īśvara and thus īśvarapraṇidhāna as devotion to God, that the
goal of Yoga is to achieve union with īśvara. Therefore, the path Patañjali proposes
would be centered on puruṣa somehow merging with īśvara, however, Patañjali does not
speak of merging or uniting with īśvara at all. First of all, he clearly defines Yoga as the
cessation of the fluctuations of the mind (YS I.2). As these fluctuations are a natural
involuntary process of the mind, the endeavor towards cessation would imply voluntary
effort, and thus a determination towards action. In this sense, “Yuj, from meaning to join,
came, by means of a very old metaphor, to mean to join oneself to something, to harness
oneself for some work. Thus Yuj assumed the sense of preparing for hard work” (Müller,
The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 309), and not necessarily in the sense of physically
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joining, as the word saṃyoga, for example, denotes. Furthermore, he uses the word
saṃyoga in negative terms, as it is the bond that keeps puruṣa misidentified with prakṛti.
It is the dissolution of this bond that leads to the goal of the path (YS II.25).
Secondly, Patañjali clearly defines the result of the practice of Yoga as the
establishment, or rather remaining (avasthānam), of the seer (drṣṭu) in its own nature
(YSI.3), through a state of samādhi towards the attainment of kaivalya, and the failure of
that achievement (itaratra), as the identification with the fluctuations that were not
controlled (YSI.4). The means he prescribes in order to achieve that goal is through
practice (abhyāsa) and dispassion (vairagya) (YS I.12), further describing different
techniques in order to adhere to that means. The yogi reaches the goal of standing in its
own nature through the attainment of kaivalya, which Patañjali defines as the destruction
of the connection (saṃyoga) between puruṣa and prakṛti, which follows the destruction
of avidyā, or ignorance, which is the root cause of the cognitive error (YSII.25).
Therefore, as per Patañjali’s path, it is discrimination or separation, rather than union,
that leads to the achievement of the goal of Yoga, for Patañjali “did not mean union with
God, or anything but effort (Udyoga, not Saṃyoga), pulling oneself together, exertion,
concentration” (Müller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy 310).
Thirdly, even in the Vedāntic understanding of Brahman, to which many have
attempted to read theism into as well, there is no such thing as union of the ātman with
Brahman per se. The misunderstanding that arises in the interpretation of Vedāntic
doctrine from later devotional practices has led to the understanding that the Self searches
to merge with Brahman, and hence describes the goal of the system as union with the
divine. This, however, is not the case, as the Self is not considered to be separate from
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Brahman, for Brahman and the Self are one and the same. The cognitive error in this case
is due to the perception that they are separate, thus, the solution, and hence the goal of the
system is the realization that the separation is an illusion; yet there is no merging or
union, for they have always been one. In this light, at least in the cases of the Vedānta
and Classical Yoga, a more accurate translation of the term Yoga would be in the sense
of harnessing or discipline.
A devotional or pseudo-theistic understanding of the term īśvara would define him
as an outside agent who has the power to actively get involved in the world and grant
liberation to those who worship him, as some suggest, as is the following example: “It
appears that the ‘grace’ of the ‘lord’ (īśvara) is also required” (Feuerstein, The Yogasūtra
of Patañjali 37). The term grace, with a highly Christian connotation due to its use in
their literature as well as common parlance, is regarded as “the generous saving activity
of God manifested toward humankind” (O’Meara 3644). This understanding implies an
agent who is a creator and more importantly sustainer of the universe, which would hence
exist outside the strict dualistic model of the ontology of Classical Yoga, as well as that
of Classical Sāṃkhya. Since it has been established that Patañjali makes very clear that
there are no realities that exist outside or above puruṣa and prakṛti, it would be
impossible that Patañjali ever had in mind an exoteric understanding of his path as well
as a devotional role of īśvara, leading to the conclusion that all theistic interpretations of
Classical Yoga are a complete imposition on the reading of the text.
Much rather than God, from the present analysis, the term īśvara and its
functionality within the Yogasūtra, particularly pertaining to the concept of
īśvarapraṇidhāna, emerges as the representation of an empirical concept and a functional
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component of the path of Yoga, rather than an ontological concept. Its functionality is
defined by the experiential nature of the system itself, for its focus is not exclusively
philosophical in the sense that it seeks to present a new philosophy in its own right, but
rather presents a series of techniques to be used in order to achieve a series of experiences
leading towards the ultimate goal of yoga, kaivalya or isolation in one’s own nature.
Thus, much rather than being or representing God, and thus being the determinant for the
system of Classical Yoga to be classified as theistic, īśvara represents the ultimate ideal
of the goal of Yoga: a puruṣa that has never lost its identity to its misidentification with
prakṛti, and as such, it functions as a practical and experiential tool, by being an
archetype of this ultimate reality, providing the yogi with a direct experience of puruṣa,
where he is able to get a direct glimpse of its true nature. This appears to be the extent of
the functionality of īśvara in the system, as well as the extent of his role of the guru or
teacher of the yogi in his path towards liberation. Hence, the presence of the term īśvara
in the Yogasūtra serves a utilitarian role by allowing the yogi to be directly engaged with
the concept of puruṣa in a space of experiential interaction rather than attempting to
expound on a particular philosophy.
Having established that īśvara, existing within the constraints of Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s
dualistic cosmology, is a puruṣa who has never been bound by prakṛti, and that the path
Patañjali proposes follows a path of involution towards isolation (kaivalya), it becomes
evident not only that īśvara is not God, but that the existence or not existence of a theistic
God is irrelevant in the path of Classical Yoga, for the path of Classical Yoga
demonstrates to be beyond the classification of both theism and atheism, as it does not
actively seek to neither prove nor disprove the existence of God. Whether īśvara is
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perceived by some as an “inactive deity” (Deussen qtd. in Burley 39), the Supreme
Creator Brahman (Vijñānabhikṣu), or an experiential reality, since it is not a creator, nor
sustainer, and has in fact, by definition, no means to function within prakṛti, and thus has
no role in the liberation of puruṣas, the existence or non-existence of God is utterly
irrelevant in Classical Yoga.
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